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Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection
Timothy Greene*
What’s in a word? As it turns out, quite a lot. The vast majority of
words in our language, including trademarked terms, signify a variety
of conceptual meanings and senses. This idea of splintered definition—
described in the psycholinguistics literature as “semantic ambiguity”
and offered in two flavors: “homonymy” (divergent and unrelated
meanings) and “polysemy” (divergent yet related senses)—is
underrepresented in trademark law. As a result, there has been a
proliferation of legal doctrines that fail to accurately describe our
linguistic lives, most notably including dilution and genericness. This
Article draws on psycholinguistics literature on semantic ambiguity
resolution to highlight these doctrinal failures and proposes several
ways in which the law might better account for polysemy and
homonymy. In addition to bringing the law into line with the lived
experience of language, these changes have the added benefit of
promoting the communicative and competitive interests at the heart of
trademark law.
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INTRODUCTION
What does the word “fly” mean? It could mean beautiful (“Shorty
stay fly, that’s why I keep her”),1 an insect of the order Diptera (a fruit
fly), travel through the air, the opening on the front of a pair of pants
(“zip your fly”), a baseball hit into the air (a “pop fly”), or a particular
route a wide receiver runs in football (“Vernon Davis is the NFL’s
premier fly route running tight end”). These definitions are context
dependent—linguistically, visually, and spatially. They are also
minimally confusing when the context is clear. If someone says she
“caught a fly,” she could mean different things. And whether the
listener understands her to mean she intercepted a baseball or captured a
bug will depend on circumstances including where she was or what she
had in her hand (a baseball mitt or a bell jar).
This kind of context-specific meaning is well recognized across
academic domains.2 Yet (with certain exceptions discussed below),
trademark law generally overlooks the idea that a term can connote
separate concepts without confusing consumers (or harming
producers).3 This overlooked idea has important implications for
1. 50 CENT, Do You Think About Me, on BEFORE I SELF DESTRUCT (Aftermath 2009).
2. See, e.g., LEXICAL AMBIGUITY RESOLUTION: PERSPECTIVES FROM PSYCHOLINGUISTICS,
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Steven L. Small et al. eds., 1988).
3. Though the idea certainly hasn’t escaped scholars, especially those with a cultural or
semiotic bent. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So
Should We Be Paying Rent?: Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 149 (1996) (“If, indeed, symbols are routinely assigned multiple
meanings, the law ought to start from the premise that audiences have a great deal of experience
with confusing signals and that, absent a specific reason to believe otherwise, the interpretive
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various trademark doctrines.
Most words are ambiguous.
They are “polysemous” or
“homonymous.” Homonymy is perhaps easier to understand, and more
or less refers to words that have unrelated meanings by historical
accident.4 To take one simple example, “bank” may refer to a financial
institution or, among other things, a river’s edge.
Polysemy, by contrast, is a bit more difficult to understand, but is, in
fact, much more pervasive than homonymy. Polysemy refers to the
phenomenon whereby words develop related meanings (“senses”),
often through productive relationships found in most words in a
semantic domain.5 For example, “paper” may refer to, among other
things, a material on which writers write (a piece of paper), a newspaper
(“I’m going to pick up the paper before heading into the office”), or an
entity that runs a newspaper (“the paper just fired five journalists”). So,
homonymy refers to unrelated “meanings,” while polysemy refers to
related meanings, referred to as “senses.”
This Article mines psycholinguistics research on how people actually
resolve these semantic ambiguities in real time in order to place some
thorny issues in trademark law into perspective. For example, many
firms make “thermoses,” including Stanley, Aladdin, and Thermos LLC
(the successor to the original THERMOS mark). Although Thermos LLC
strategies that a listener ordinarily pursues will also be used in the marketplace.”); Laura A.
Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1342 (2010) (“The
use of the lowercased (by implication in aural speech) ‘coke’ does not indicate that ‘Coke’ no
longer serves as a proper name; rather, it simply means that the lowercased form is used to refer
to a category of similar items (‘drinks that are like Coke’), just as ‘xerox’ is often used to refer to
a category of photocopiers, of which ‘Xerox’ is one, and ‘tylenol’ is used to refer to the drug with
the formulaic name of acetaminophen, of which ‘Tylenol’ is a particular brand name.”); see also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 413 (1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity] (“[S]ome words have core denotations . . . and a set of connotations that depend upon
their history, derivation, and identification with users.”).
4. A quick disclaimer: many homonyms can be traced back to semantic drift that has taken
place over the course of hundreds of years. The key thing to remember is that, for the average
person encountering these terms, they will not easily recognize those connections. Thus, for all
practical purposes, the words’ meanings are unrelated.
5. One good example of polysemy’s natural occurrence is provided by Albert Hirschman, who
traced the semantic drift of the term “interest” in the first chapter of his book The Passions and
the Interests. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 31–41 (1977).
As Hirschman shows, the term “interest”—as in “self-interest” or “interest groups”—began as
something of a catch-all for “a disciplined understanding of what it takes to advance one’s power,
influence, and wealth.” Over time, “interest” took on a more constrained definition, connoting
only “material, economic advantage.” Id. During this period of drift, various thinkers tried to tie
down the word’s meaning, to no avail. As a result, these thinkers often talked past one another
when detailing the costs and benefits of using “interest” talk as a guide to the good life.
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can’t prevent Stanley and Aladdin from calling their products
“thermoses,”6 Thermos LLC continues to operate a very strong brand
using a stylized version of THERMOS as a trademark. In the market for
vacuum bottles, Thermos LLC distinguishes its THERMOS brand from
other producers’ vacuum bottles based on contextual features7 used with
the term. If someone asks “can you get me a thermos?” your answer
may depend on spatial clues. Are you online at Amazon.com, shopping
a smorgasbord of vacuum bottles? You may be likely to order the
THERMOS-brand bottle. Are you in a kitchen? You might reach for any
brand vacuum bottle (THERMOS or not) rather than a coffee mug. And if
you have a choice among vacuum bottles, you might select based on a
visual cue: the particular stylized font Thermos LLC uses for its
company logo.8 To take an example closer to this author’s heart, a
trademark lawyer’s understanding of what a speaker means by
“Abercrombie” will likely depend on whether the conversation is about
trademark law or the lawyer’s teenage daughter.9
We should not be surprised that terms can carry multiple
significances—here, at least two: generic product and specific source.10
Yet the law usually does not recognize this except in haphazard and
inconsistent ways. Professors Folsom and Teply recognized the false
binary between “source” and “generic” as early as 1980, but it still
remains for the most part unaddressed in the law.11 Following their
6. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963)
(affirming the district court’s decision that “thermos” had become generic for vacuum flasks).
7. Throughout this Article, I use the term “context” to refer broadly to those elements that lend
texture to our experiences. For example, context might include visual indicators such as color,
shape, size, typeface, and logo location on packaging, spatial indicators like geographic
closeness—where is the product placed on the shelf?—or linguistic context such as spelling,
punctuation, location within a phrase or sentence, and so on.
8. See Thomas R. Lee et al, An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark
Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1099 (2009) (discussing how customers rely primarily on
non-linguistic, visual cues rather than a mark’s semantic meaning).
9. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)
(establishing a taxonomy of word mark types).
10. Cf. ADAM ARVIDSSON, BRANDS: MEANING AND VALUE IN MEDIA CULTURE 8 (2006)
(“[B]rands do not so much stand for products, as much as they provide a part of the context in
which products are used. This is the core component of the use-value that brands provide
consumers with.”).
11. See Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323,
1350 (1980) [hereinafter Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words] (arguing the binary
categorization of “common” and “brand name” is the largest problem with then-current
approaches to trademark genericness); see also Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Surveying
‘Genericness’ in Trademark Litigation, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Folsom &
Teply, Surveying ‘Genericness’] (setting forth a model for more accurately surveying genericness
and accounting for hybridity); Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, A Reply to Swann and
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lead, in this Article I use the term “trademark hybridity” to refer to a
trademark’s ability to simultaneously connote a variety of meanings and
senses. But trademark hybridity isn’t limited solely to product (generic)
and source significance12 as Professors Folsom and Teply implied. A
rich literature has developed around the premise that, in addition to
trademarks’ value in signifying source and raising brand awareness,
they are also used expressively,13 nominatively,14 and descriptively.15
Through their adoption as cultural signifiers, trademarks are necessarily
infused with social meanings.16
A given term need not be understood only as a generic term or only as
a source identifier. Indeed, a term cannot merely be understood as such.
Rather, all terms—and perhaps especially words used as trademarks17—
embody multiple concepts with little quantifiable (internal or external)
confusion. People use context to provide semantically ambiguous
words with meaning in every sentence we speak, hear, read, or write.
Trademarks are source identifiers, but what is often overlooked is how

Palladino’s Critique of Folsom and Teply’s Model Survey, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 197 (1988)
[hereinafter Folsom & Teply, A Reply to Swann].
12. For clarity, Folsom and Teply do not use “product” and “source” significance to describe
dual hybridity. Rather, they describe a trademarked term’s “product” and “producer” senses.
13. See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[O]nly the use of a trademark with ‘“no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever”‘
does not merit First Amendment protection . . . . In other words, the level of relevance merely
must be above zero.” (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir.
2002); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989))).
14. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1992)
(affirming district court’s judgment in favor of defendants based on the argument that “New
Kids” was used to refer nominatively to the New Kids on the Block); Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[In] advertising [the repair of
Volkswagen cars, it] would be difficult, if not impossible, for [appellee] to avoid altogether the
use of the word ‘Volkswagen’ or its abbreviation ‘VW,’ which are the normal terms which, to the
public at large, signify appellant’s cars.”); see also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368
(1924) (“When the [word] mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no such
sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.”).
15. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 115–16
(2004) (discussing “microcolor” permanent makeup); Schmid Labs. v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 14, 17–20 (D.N.J. 1979) (discussing “ribbed” condoms).
16. Cultural studies scholarship has much to contribute to our understanding of how
trademarks are reconstituted, reappropriated, and reused in culture. See, e.g., SARAH BANETWEISER, AUTHENTIC(TM) (N.Y.U. Press 2012) (illustrating the ways in which various cultures,
such as contemporary religion and femininity, are increasingly understood within the language of
brands); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (Duke Univ. Press 1998) (describing how
intellectual property protection both restricts and compels certain types of cultural appropriation).
17. See generally COOMBE, supra note 16 (discussing how word marks and logos constitute
an increasingly large part of contemporary cultural dialogue).
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they identify source. It is not just the term used that signifies source,
but the term when used in combination with relevant disambiguating
context, such as colors, typefaces, product packaging, logos, logo
placement on packaging, product categories, and so on.
Though trademark scholars have brought various strands of cognitive
psychology scholarship to bear on questions in trademark law, the
research on semantic ambiguity resolution has not yet been addressed,
despite its rather obvious relevance. Filling that gap, I propose a
hypothesis about trademarks and semantic ambiguity resolution, as well
as provide a preliminary sketch of a follow-on empirical research
agenda. There are three elements to the hypothesis. First, a premise:
word marks are linguistic, and there is little reason to think trademarks
exhibit psycholinguistic characteristics that distinguish them
fundamentally from all other words. Even if consumers process
trademarks as proper nouns, they still use context to disambiguate such
words. Second, consistent with other lines of cognitive and consumer
psychology research previously mined by scholars like Professors
Tushnet and Lee, semantic ambiguity resolution research reveals that
“context is king.”18
Rarely (if ever) do consumers encounter
trademarks acontextually, and it seems likely such contextualization
allays any concern we might have about genericness or dilution harms.
Third, as Professor Klerman has argued, even if consumers experience
statistically significant confusion when presented with appropriate
context, it is less likely that those harms would be commercially
significant—that is, that the effects would or might alter consumers’
decision-making.19
This Article is intended to set forth the
psycholinguistic case for these assertions.
Although trademark hybridity is barely recognized in the law, it is
quickly becoming more important for commerce and communication.
Mark holders are aggressive and sometimes brazen in seeking broad
protection for their marks, and far more than ever before. In so doing,
mark holders use the legal trademark monopoly in an effort to attain
market monopoly status by controlling the conversations regarding their
brands.20 This model of trademark protection assumes that diverse

18. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86
TEX. L. REV. 507, 529 (2008); see also Lee et al., supra note 8, at 1057 (describing “contextual
markers,” such as distinctive print and prominent placement of a logo on the product or its
packaging, used by marketers and consumers to lend source-significance to products).
19. Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006).
20. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 140
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meanings will muddle those mark holders’ brands to their detriment.
But, as explained in more detail throughout this Article, a significant
amount of relevant psychological research does not sufficiently support
that assumption or the mark holders’ view.
Instead, trademark law and practice has developed into a system in
which Dr. Dre’s Beats Electronics can credibly file oppositions against
producers of a wide variety of goods for seeking to procure trademark
registrations for iterations of the words “beat” and “beats,” arguing
those uses will confuse consumers into thinking the goods came from
Beats Electronics, or dilute the connection in consumers’ minds
This system stifles
between the word “beat” and BEATS.21
communication and competition, as described below. By recognizing
trademark hybridity and tailoring trademark doctrine to fit its teachings
with respect to the importance of context and the complexity of the
marketplace, we can improve the system.
Part I’s purpose is two-fold. First, in Part I.A., this Article describes
the traditional theoretical bases for trademark protection, noting how the
law has steadily moved away from those bases. Second, in Part I.B.,
this Article describes the current psycholinguistics research on semantic
ambiguity resolution and applies it to trademark law. Together, Parts
I.A and I.B illustrate how courts and the Trademark Office place an
undue amount of weight on trademarks’ lexical aspects, when the
traditional source-identification rationale is best served by more
constraints on individual trademark scope. In Part II, this Article
applies the observations made in Part I to several doctrinal and
theoretical issues in trademark law, finding trademark law wanting in its
recognition of context as the prime mover of semantic ambiguity
resolution. In Part III, this Article concludes with several proposals for
reform based on the observations set forth in this Article. These
proposals include reexamining the basis for protecting plain word
marks, refocusing aspects of the likelihood of confusion tests in order to
improve their sensitivity to context, recalibrating genericness surveys to
be more attentive to context, and limiting producers’ control over
(2010) (“[U]ltimately, the free-riding claims [of mark holders] are even more sweeping than
ownership of marks: trademark owners sometimes are effectively asserting the right to own
markets themselves because . . . the relevant market owes its origin to their brands.”).
21. See Jacob Gershman, Dr. Dre in Trademark Battle, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013
4:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/03/06/dr-dre-in-trademark-beat-down/ (detailing Beats
Electronics’ efforts to challenge trademark applicants’ attempts to register “beat” or “beats” as a
trademark—even when not used in connection with headphones or when in combination with
other words—based on a purported likelihood of confusion with the company’s BEATS mark for
headphones and speaker systems).
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emergent expressive meanings.
I. TRADEMARK HYBRIDITY
Trademark language is slippery. Judges, practitioners, and scholars
use “trademark” and “brand” interchangeably, often without a real
understanding that “brand” is a different and considerably broader set.
This is in part because scholars often apply marketing literature to
trademarks without due care for systematically distinguishing between
them.22 Judges apply rules to brands without regard to the fact that
what they are dealing with is only the trademarked term.23
Trademark law’s origins lie in the control of commercial language.24
22. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987) (“The value of a trademark is the saving in search
costs made possible by the information or reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies
about the brand . . . .”). The key here is not that these scholars don’t understand the difference,
but rather that they tend to assume that the word mark is the primary value-driver rather than the
overarching brand itself. Or, more sanguinely, they simply slip into using the terms
interchangeably in order to mix up the monotony of continually writing “trademark” or “mark.”
23. See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2003) (on determining
that a word mark is generic, Judge Posner wrote: “[I]t may confuse consumers who continue to
associate the trademark with the owner’s brand when they encounter what they thought a brand
name on another seller’s brand”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 393 F.
Supp. 502, 527–28 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (regarding the paradigmatic TEFLON case, the court found
persuasive a survey that asked respondents whether certain product names were “brand name[s]
or trademark[s]” or generic names); see also In re Trek 2000 Int’l Ltd., 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1106, 1112, 1114 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (ignoring significant evidence of consumer usage of
THUMBDRIVE as a generic term, the T.T.A.B. credited evidence that “certain of the media outlets
present in the examining attorney’s evidence have agreed to cease misuse of the term” and the
absence of competitors using the term, and thereafter found that the word mark was not generic).
24. Whether these origins were normatively propelled by consumer protection or producer
protection is very much a subject of debate in trademark scholarship. Compare Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1849–
96 (2007) (arguing early trademark law was premised on protecting producers against “unfair”
competition), with Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs
on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (arguing the historic normative goal of
trademark law is to reduce search costs by fostering information flow in markets) [hereinafter
Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs]; William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) (arguing
trademark law “tr[ies] to promote economic efficiency”), and Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999) (“Ownership was assigned to the person who
adopted the mark for her trade, not because she had created it or its favorable associations, but
because such person was conveniently placed and strongly motivated to vindicate the broader
public interest in a mark’s ability to identify accurately the source of the goods to which it was
attached.”).I tend to side with Professor Bone in this particular battle. In his view, American
trademark law has always contained producer-protective and consumer-protective strands. See
generally Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547 (2006). The question, then, is a normative one: whose
interests should trademark law promote, under what circumstances, and to what extent?
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The law has since outgrown those origins, such that trademark’s scope
now covers nearly anything that can signify some consistent source as a
trademark.25 Courts and legislatures have consistently expanded the
scope of trademark protection to incorporate brand concepts.26
Meanwhile, many trademarks contain vestigial remnants of their
origins, when producers had limited means of differentiating their
products from others’. In the early days of U.S. trademark protection, a
trademarked term was the primary legal protection for differentiating
one producer’s product from another’s.27
This tension is a problem. A trademark has been traditionally defined
as a term—later, sounds, shapes, and so on—used in connection with
goods or services that signifies their source. By contrast, branding
refers to the “durable identity and [consumer] loyalty” developed
through producers’ use of design, packaging, logos, graphics,
marketing, and other related strategies.28 The durable identity and
loyalty of branding, along with expressive social meanings that become
attached to the identity and the mark over time, are what I, following
Professors Desai and Waller, refer to here as the brand.29
In addition to the simple source identification character a term or
logo may have, it may also be used for other purposes, such as signaling
status or an affinity with a social group.30 Understandably, mark
25. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
ch. 7 (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan 4th ed. 2013) (outlining the variety of subject matter in which
a trademark may be claimed, from words to color to fragrance and flavor); see also Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (“Since human beings might use as a
‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language,
read literally, is not restrictive.”).
26. See generally Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981 (2012);
see also Laura A. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1227, 1243 (2008).
27. Trade dress protection came much later, and, as Professor Lunney shows, the extension of
Lanham Act protection to trade dress is not supported by the Act’s legislative history. See Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does Not Belong on
the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1134–35 (2000) (describing the allowance of
trade dress registration as an accident of history); MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:94, at 7-379 to
-380 (recognizing Congress’s initial decision not to permit trade dress registration on the
principal register); see also Lunney, supra note 24, at 373–91 (arguing that Congress did not
intend to protect trade dress under the Lanham Act).
28. Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1425, 1431.
29. See generally COOMBE, supra note 16.
30. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624
(2004) [hereinafter Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law] (“In asserting that
trademarks do no more than facilitate search and encourage quality, the [Law and Economics
school] has long declined to acknowledge what is obvious: that firms produce trademarks as
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holders have long utilized the courts in attempts to control these
concepts.31 In myriad ways, courts have helped mark holders expand
the law to govern these concepts without due regard for the implications
of the approach. As a result, trademark law has become inefficient,
frayed and unwieldy. Trademark hybridity offers one way of thinking
about how to update trademark law to today’s brand practice.
As I explain in this Article, trademark hybridity means that a given
term can be understood to connote multiple separate, and—to some
extent contradictory—ideas, persons, or things. In Part A, I describe the
traditional theoretical bases of trademark protection—source
identification and quality control—and briefly describe how brand
protection has seeped into the analysis. In Part B, I describe the
psycholinguistics literature on semantic ambiguity resolution. This
literature illustrates how individuals process language in order to make
sense out of the world. Brand protection is problematic in large part
because factfinders do not assiduously distinguish a word mark’s
linguistic aspects from the contextual factors that serve to practically
disambiguate it from other similar terms. As a result, the level of
protection granted to word marks vastly outstrips trademark’s
traditional justifications.32
The inconsistency between the high level of protection granted to
brands and trademark hybridity might be descriptively acceptable, but
is, for the reasons described below, normatively unworkable.
A. The Traditional Theoretical Bases
of Trademark Protection
Trademark law reflects a number of important interests, not the least
of which are generalized interests in promoting market competition and
free communication both inside and outside the marketplace. These

status goods, that consumers consume trademarks to signal status, and that courts routinely invest
trademarks with legal protection in an effort to preserve this status-signaling function.”); see also
Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809 (2010)
[hereinafter Beebe, Intellectual Property and the Sumptuary Code]. See generally THORSTEIN
VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF LEISURE CLASS (1899).
31. See generally Desai, supra note 26.
32. For example, in 2013, the fast food restaurant Chick-Fil-A, which holds a registered
trademark in the phrase “Eat mor chikin” for use with restaurant services, filed an opposition with
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in an attempt to prevent folk artist Robert Muller-Moore
from registering the phrase “Eat More Kale” for use on t-shirts and other apparel. See, e.g.,
Caroline Kim, ‘Eat More Kale’ Company Losing Against Chick-Fil-A, The Exchange, YAHOO!
FINANCE (Apr. 25, 2013 5:21 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/eat-more-kalecompany-losing-against-chick-fil-212157027.html.
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interests can be found in the foundations of trademark law. First, as
Judge Posner and Professor Landes noted in their seminal work on the
law and economics of trademark law, a trademark’s value lies in “the
saving in search costs made possible by the information or reputation
that the trademark conveys or embodies about the brand.”33 In this
view, the trademark is an information vessel that eases the consumer’s
burden in identifying and selecting preferred products. Second, the law
protects trademarks as an incentive for producers to promote a
consistent level of quality in their products.34 Producers, the theory
goes, have little incentive to invest in developing quality products
without a way to capture that value. Trademark law provides that
mechanism. Both rationales are premised on benefitting consumers,
though they undoubtedly benefit producers as well.35
While producers have long used many types of marketing to generate

33. Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 270: see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514
U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a sourceidentifying mark, ‘reduc[es] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing
decisions’ . . . for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with
this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or
disliked) in the past.” (internal citations omitted)); Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co.,
419 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Trademark law is designed to reduce the cost customers incur
in learning who makes the product, and this also helps sellers obtain rewards from producing
goods of consistent quality, for customers will find it easier to find and buy goods with which
they have been satisfied in the past.”).
34. Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 269–70; see also Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park &
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (“National protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress
concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to
the producer the benefits of good reputation.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 2:4, at 2-8 (“If your
mistakes and blunders are untraceable, there is little incentive to do a quality job.”).
35. Scholars have justified trademark law on other theoretical grounds such as, for example,
Kantian deontology. See, e.g., Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV.
761 (2013). The law and economics view—search costs and quality-control—is, however, the
current dominant theoretical justification for trademark law and for that reason it is the view with
which I primarily deal here. See, e.g., Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of
Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265, 289 (1975) (“A trademark does not necessarily guarantee
good quality. What it does guarantee is consistency.”); Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and
Consumer Search Costs, supra note 24, at 786–87 (“Rather than having to inquire into the
provenance and qualities of every potential purchase, consumers can look to trademarks as
shorthand indicators. Because information is less expensive, consumers will demand more of it
and will arguably become better informed, resulting in a more competitive market.”); see also
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163–64; Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198 (“National protection of trademarks is
desirable, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of
quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”) (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1333
at 4 (1946)). But see Desai & Waller, supra note 28, at 1447 (claiming that marks reducing
search costs “is merely a part of a mark’s function and, in fact, an unintended consequence. The
desire to shape markets and generate demand, at work during the early history of trademarks, runs
contrary to the neoclassical model of markets on which the search costs theory is based.”).
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consumer knowledge of, and (hopefully) demand for, their products—
for example, distinctive product packaging and commercial
advertising—the use of word marks to identify source was the primary
method by which producers protected their interests in the early days of
trademark law. But times have changed. As Professor Desai has
illustrated, more than simple product market dominance, today’s mark
holders are often more interested in developing the “aura” around their
trademarks, and the prestige value associated with that aura, as a way to
maximize returns.36 Source identification is an argumentative means to
that end, as trademark law’s subject matter has experienced significant
scope creep. Courts have adopted new theories of confusion, such as
post-sale and initial interest confusion, and have recognized a
merchandising right as well—none of these extensions can be justified
by the traditional rationales.37 Trademarks have become more garish as
well—rarely, if ever, is a word mark seen in the market context
disembodied from its stylized typeface and logo. Constant repetition of
aural and visual stimulants, in addition to the consistent use of a word
mark, is necessary for today’s brand manager to create value.
Recognizing this shift, courts and the Trademark Office have
considerably broadened trade dress protection. Mark holders can now
claim a protectable interest in, among other things, color38 and shape.
And the logic of trademark’s expansion to govern trade dress—anything
that “signals source” can be protected under the Lanham Act—has also

36. See generally Desai, supra note 26.
37. See id. at 1025–26 (discussing initial interest and post-sale confusion). Initial interest
confusion is aimed at a situation in which a consumer is initially drawn to Producer A’s goods or
services because the consumer mistakenly believes Producer A to be Producer B. By the time the
consumer purchases goods or services from Producer A, the consumer knows she is not dealing
with Producer B, but decides to make the purchase anyway. The doctrine thus “has little to do
with [the] rational choice problems that traditionally animate trademark law.” Id. at 1025 (citing
generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005)). Post-sale confusion is aimed mostly at
knock-off goods: the consumer purchases goods knowing that those goods are not made by
Producer A, but uninterested third-parties, seeing the consumer using those goods, presumably
will be dissuaded from making further purchases from Producer A. In addressing this situation,
the law protects the mark’s prestige. See Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary
Code, supra note 30, at 851–55; Rothman, supra note 37, at 1026; Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen
Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012).
38. See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 174 (holding that “a color may sometimes meet the basic
legal requirements for use as a trademark”); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am.
Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining, in a case involving a trademark
claimed in red shoe soles, that “limit[ing] the trademark to uses in which the red outsole contrasts
with the remainder of the shoe”).
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allowed mark holders to seek protection for buildings—both interior39
and exterior40—as well as vehicles,41 clothing,42 sounds,43 fragrances,44
flavors,45 and tactile feelings.46 Though individually protectable—at
least in theory—each of these elements together combine with a word
mark or logo to create the “experience” of an individual brand.
As I have argued in other work, and as I argue in more detail below,
the loss of any individual element—including the word mark through
genericness, or a particular design feature through functionality—does
not imperil “the brand.” Rather, the remaining aspects are still
protectable and, at least with respect to word marks, the overall
presentation of the mark remains protectable against confusing uses via
unfair competition and false advertising law. As I describe below, this
observation is important because it provides a rather significant reason
to push back against the expanding scope of certain types of “irrelevant
confusion.”47 The mark holder has plenty of tools at its disposal. There
is no need to create or expand doctrines to push the expansion any
further than it already is, and there is, in fact, good reason to reel back
much of this expansion.

39. See, e.g., Happy Sumo Sushi, Inc. v. Yapona, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-348 TS, 2008 WL
3539628, at *3–4 (D. Utah Aug. 11, 2008); Warehouse Rest., Inc. v. Customs House Rest., Inc.,
No. C 80 3054, 1982 WL 51043, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 1982); see also MCCARTHY, supra
note 25, § 7:100; Jerre B. Swann, The Design of Restaurant Interiors: A New Approach to
Aesthetic Functionality, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 408 (1986).
40. See, e.g., House of Hunan, Inc. v. Hunan at Pavilion, No. 85-1591, 1985 WL 72671, at
*2–3 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1985) (finding that decorative, outdoor lion statues constituted a valid
service mark); Assoc. Hosts of Cal., Inc. v. Moss, No. C-C-79-254, 1979 WL 24962, at *2
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 1979) (noting that the interior and exterior restaurant designs constituted
distinctive trade dress); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:100.
41. See MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:102 (describing cases involving yellow cabs).
42. See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., No. 88 Civ. 6444(RJW), 1989 WL
282850 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In
re Jockey Int’l, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 579 (T.T.A.B. 1976); see also MCCARTHY, supra note
25, § 7:103.
43. See, e.g., In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978); see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:104, at 7-417 to -419 (noting registrations and describing cases).
44. See, e.g., In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990); see also MCCARTHY,
supra note 25, § 7:106, at 7-425 (“The design of a customized and distinctive scent for a business
has grown into new enterprise. The use of such ‘signature scents’ is expanding.”).
45. See, e.g., In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639, 1650–51 (T.T.A.B. 2006)
(denying registration of orange flavor for dissolving antidepressant tablets on functionality
grounds, but noting that flavor may be protectable on a showing of secondary meaning); see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:107.
46. See MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:108 (noting registrations).
47. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413,
427 (2010) (distinguishing material from immaterial confusion).

GREENE PRINT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

88

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/4/2014 1:57 PM

[Vol. 46

Nonetheless, mark holders continue to try to tie down individual
words, regardless of the impact disambiguating context has on whether
consumers see these terms as a lone signifying source. As noted in the
Introduction, source identification requires more than simply identifying
the term. Rather, source identification is a combination of the term and
its context, including: colors, typefaces, product packaging, logo
placement on packaging, or product category, among other factors.48
B. Semantic Ambiguity (and How We Resolve
It Through Context)49
1. The Basics: Polysemy and Homonymy,
Senses, and Meanings
Words nearly always refer to more than one concept, in which case
they are semantically ambiguous.50 For example, much like the word
“fly” discussed above,51 the word “bank” has multiple definitions. As a
noun, it can be a financial institution, river curtilage, or snow pile. As a
verb, it can be a shot off the glass in basketball or a shot off the rail in
pool. Semantically ambiguous words like “fly” and “bank” can be
ambiguous in two ways: (1) they can have separate unrelated meanings
(like “bank” for a financial institution or a river’s edge); or (2) they can
have separate related senses (like “fly” for the process by which an
object moves through the air without direct support or a “fly,” an insect
that “flies”).52 Again, words with separate unrelated meanings are
homonymous, while words with separate related meanings (senses) are

48. See Lee et al., supra note 8, at 1077 (discussing source identification in the context of a
hypothetical distinctive word mark).
49. This Part describes a line of research regarding the cognitive processes that occur during
reading. This line, of course, is not the only line of cognitive psychology research that bears on
how we understand trademarks in the context of actual trademark use. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra
note 8 (providing results of visual cuing experiments); Sven L. Mattys, Speech Perception, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 391 (Daniel Reisberg ed., 2013).
50. See Jennifer Rodd et al., Making Sense of Semantic Ambiguity: Semantic Competition in
Lexical Access, 46 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 245, 250 (2002) (citing R.H. BAAYEN ET AL.,
LINGUISTIC DATA CONSORTIUM, U. PA. (The CELEX Lexical Database CD-ROM, 1993)
(noting, of the 4930 entries in The Online Wordsmyth English Dictionary-Thesaurus with wordform frequencies of greater than ten per million, only 7.4% of the word-forms correspond to more
than one entry in the dictionary, 84% have more than one sense, and 37% have more than five
senses). For discussions of semantic ambiguity resolution, see generally EVA M. FERNANDEZ &
HELEN SMITH CAIRNS, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 190 (2011); LEXICAL
AMBIGUITY RESOLUTION, supra note 2; Keith Rayner & Alexander Pollatsek, Basic Processes in
Reading, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 442 (Daniel Reisberg ed., 2013).
51. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
52. Rodd et al., supra note 50, at 245.
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polysemous.
Trademarked terms (and words) are often—in fact, almost always—
polysemous. BUICK may refer to a particular brand of car, but it is also
a traditional Scottish surname, an English geographical place name, and
an American slang term for vomit.53 Descriptive marks—like CLEAN &
CLEAR—are explicitly polysemous; these terms correspond to
preexisting terms and are adopted in senses adjacent to the original
term’s definition (CLEAN & CLEAR will, presumably, make your skin
“clean and clear”). By contrast, arbitrary marks—like APPLE for
computers—are homonymous; they create a new, typically unrelated
meaning for the term completely apart from its original meaning(s).
Even sui generis marks—such as fanciful marks like KODAK for
cameras or merged personal name marks like ROLLS-ROYCE for cars—
often become polysemous over time as consumers come to utilize them
in everyday language. For example, saying something is the “RollsRoyce of its class” implicates two senses of “Rolls-Royce.” The phrase
refers to the trademarked term, but also uses it metaphorically in the
sense of “high-quality.”54 Even the homonymous, unrelated meaning
can develop further polysemous senses as consumers interact with and
interpret the term in new ways.
I propose that the temporal tendency towards polysemy is the
psycholinguistic process through which trademarked terms can become
generic. For example, “thermos” may now refer to the product or the
brand, although at the time the term was adopted, it presumably referred
primarily to the brand.55 Similarly, homonymy can be conceived as the
53. RICHARD A. SPEARS, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG AND COLLOQUIAL
EXPRESSIONS 49 (4th ed. 2007).
54. See Devorah E. Klein & Gregory L. Murphy, Paper Has Been My Ruin: Conceptual
Relations of Polysemous Senses, 47 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 548, 549 (2002). Klein and
Murphy provide the example of “paper”:
As an example, paper originally referred to a writing material, but it has evolved to
mean the substance normally used to make that material, the content of some writing,
and even an oral presentation of that content—so that we can now deliver a paper
without using any paper to do so. Other direction in which paper has been extended
include the news source (newspaper), which has been stretched to refer to the company
that publishes a paper, a representative of the company, and even the editorial policies
of the company . . . . The material sense has also expanded to encompass financial
notes, wall coverings, and gift wrap. . . . There is a continuum of polysemy, in which
closely related senses can be repeatedly extended so that “adjacent” senses are closely
related, but the more distant ones have little apparent connection.
Id. (citations omitted). “Rolls-Royce” would not mean “high-quality” without some relationship
between the term “Rolls-Royce,” the producer of Rolls-Royce automobiles, and those cars’ high
quality.
55. “Thermos” also meant “temperature regulation” when the term was adopted as a word
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process by which trademarked terms are allegedly diluted. Dilution’s
harm is said to arise from the creation of an alternate definition for the
term—the paradigm example being where a producer adopts a
preexisting well-known term (BUICK perhaps) for use on unrelated
goods or services (aspirin). The producer’s worry is that consumers
will unwittingly attribute positive or negative affective responses to
undeserving producers—BUICK no longer refers just to cars made by
one firm, but to medicine made by another as well.
But the advent of a new sense or meaning of a word does not
necessarily crowd out the other senses or meanings. Rather, the new
definition becomes enmeshed in our mental conception of the term.56
These related senses (and, for that matter, unrelated meanings) remain
representationally distinct in our minds, despite their linguistic
adjacence.57 Whether one sense (or meaning) or another is intended in
a sentence depends on the context in which the term is used. When I
ask for a “thermos,” the context in which I ask clarifies intended
meaning and reduces ambiguity.58 What you will hand me when I ask

mark. The trademark meaning can thus be understood as a sense related to the term’s underlying
original definition.
56. See Klein & Murphy, supra note 54, at 566–67 (“What is surprising about polysemy as a
general phenomenon is that the great diversity of senses does not impair fluent understanding of
everyday language.”).
57. See Klein & Murphy, supra note 54, at 564–66 (explaining why different senses are not
lexically distinguished); Devorah E. Klein & Gregory L. Murphy, The Representation of
Polysemous Words, 45 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 259, 262–66 (2001) (providing evidence that
polysemous words have different representations for each sense and that any core meaning is
minimal).
58. See Klein & Murphy, supra note 54, at 564–69 (discussing experimental results showing
that inappropriate senses are inhibited to below baseline levels to ensure proper interpretation is
achieved when context is provided); Rene Zeelenberg et al., Semantic Context Effects and
Priming in Word Association, 10 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 653, 655–56 (2003) (reporting
experimental findings showing that context can be—and is—used to disambiguate semantically
ambiguous words such that these words are less likely to cue inconsistent homonymous
meanings); see also Lyn Frazier & Keith Rayner, Taking on Semantic Commitments: Processing
Multiple Meanings vs. Multiple Senses, 29 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 181, 191 (1990) (“[The
data] suggests that readers do commit themselves to a particular sense of a word when the
intended sense is implied by the content of prior context.”); Steven Frisson & Martin J. Pickering,
The Processing of Metonymy: Evidence from Eye Movements, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 1366, 1379 (1999) (“Once readers have used [an]
underspecified meaning to assign a (rather abstract) semantic value to an expression, they can
home [sic] in on the intended sense by instantiating any underspecified features” through use of
context). The idea stated in Frisson & Pickering is called radical underspecification. In essence,
radical underspecification is the process through which “a kind of neutral placeholder is activated
until disambiguating information is encountered . . . [a]s later context emerges . . . then one sense
would be selected.” Klein & Murphy, supra note 54, at 567; cf. S.A. Duffy et al., Lexical
Ambiguity and Fixation Times in Reading, 27 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 429, 442 (1988)
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for an “apple” will depend on whether we’re at an electronics store or a
supermarket. Where confusion remains, it is generally of a type that
causes no legally cognizable harm in the sense of lost profits or harm to
reputation. Context, in other words, resolves the semantic ambiguity
quickly and nearly effortlessly.
Indeed, companies often implicitly—and systematically—admit that
consumers can tell the difference between various senses without
confusion. For example, company names are often used to refer to the
company itself and to one—or a class—of its products. For example,
“Ford has reached 75 percent of its goal to create 12,000 hourly jobs in
the U.S. by 2015,”59 (Ford = company) and “There’s a Ford in your
future with a future built in!”60 (Ford being a vehicle made by that
company). Nor do producer-product polysemies occur only in
commerce. For example, take the two sentences “Dickens died in
1914” and “I love reading Dickens.” It’s highly unlikely that any
substantial confusion, much less dilution, is likely to arise from this type
of polysemy given its prevalence in everyday language use. If that is
the case, then we should be more careful about implying some sort of
cognizable harm in analogous situations.
These observations are quite important because word marks are
almost never encountered without some disambiguating context aside
from in a lab.61 Contextual primacy is often overlooked in trademark
law, particularly with respect to surveys, and has important implications
that are discussed in the next Part.

(suggesting that, in the context of homonyms, readers activate separate meanings and select one
or the other based on the meanings’ usage frequency and overall sentence context).
59. Press Release, Ford Motors, Ford Adding 2,000-Plus Jobs at Kansas City Assembly to
Support Surging F-150 Demand, Ford Transit Launch (May 2, 2013), available at
http://corporate.ford.com/news-center/press-releases-detail/pr-ford-adding-2000plus-jobs-at37994; see also Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1847 (2007) (identifying “Do you Yahoo!?” and “Dude, you’re
getting a Dell,” which are further examples of this phenomenon).
60. HEON STEVENSON, AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ADVERTISING, 1930–1980: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 144 (McFarland 2008); cf. FIRST BLOOD (Orion Pictures 1982) (Rambo:
“. . . He’s saying, sayin’ ‘I wanna go home! I wanna go home!’ He keeps calling my name! ‘I
wanna go home, Johnny! I wanna drive my Chevy!’”).
61. See ROGER W. SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES 7 (2002) (“Context
is very important in accusations of dilution. Words in isolation seldom occur in our lives, except
in spelling bees and grocery lists.”); Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 530–32
(discussing context effects in relation to trademark dilution).
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2. Definitional Issues: “Primary” Meanings
and “Interference”
As discussed more fully below, the “primary significance” test is
used by factfinders to determine whether a term is or has become
generic. In the Lanham Act, Congress provided that “[t]he primary
significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather than
purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the
registered mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or
in connection with which it has been used.”62 Primary significance has
generally been read to pose a binary question: is the term generic or
does it retain source significance?63 This is an empirical question that
can be measured on a spectrum: does a sufficient percentage of the
relevant consuming public consider the term generic, or does the
relevant public instead consider the term to identify source? Both
questions misunderstand how the public can, and does, understand
source and product significance together. Trademark hybridity, by
contrast, recognizes that a term need not be understood for either its
generic or its source identifying function. According to hybridity, both
functions can, and do, coexist—depending on the context in which the
term is used.
It might be tempting to consider whether the primary significance test
could ask a narrower question: whether the term’s primary definition in
a consumer’s mind is the source or the product.64 That narrower
question would pose a significant problem for trademark law, because it
would acknowledge that the consumer’s mental map of the term
contains both definitions.65 But because the mental map is subjective
and internal to the consumer, how can the answer be measured
empirically?
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012); see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118
(1938) (holding for a seller to prove trademark significance in a term challenged as generic, the
seller must show that the “primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public
is not the product but the producer”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 12:6, at 12-23 to -24
(collecting cases).
63. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
64. See Jerre B. Swann & Vincent N. Palladino, Surveying “Genericness”: A Critique of
Folsom and Teply, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 179, 181 (1988) (critiquing Folsom and Teply’s survey
model on the ground that “[t]he law requires that the trier of fact make [a choice between “brand”
or “generic”] in seeking to determine the primary significance of a disputed term.”); see also E.
Deborah Jay, Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes: Evolution of Species, 99 TRADEMARK
REP. 1118, 1137 (2009) (same).
65. See Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, supra note 11, at 6–7 (describing the
potential of consumers that mentally apply both definitions); see also Desai & Rierson, supra
note 59, at 1803–05 (discussing Folsom & Teply’s hybrid marks thesis).
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Several prominent practitioners and scholars have proposed
spreading activation—an idea taken from cognitive psychology—to
advocate for antidilution protection.66 The model would seem to
provide a sketchy theory on which to base such empirical
measurements. Professor Tushnet gamely describes the theory as
follows:
In the cognitive model, blurring takes place when a single term
activates multiple, nonconfusing associations in a consumer’s mind.
Meanings or concepts, including sounds, images, and other sensory
impressions, are linked by mental networks. Concepts are activated
through links in the network, triggering related concepts. Activation
happens very fast, and if it does not continue, an unreinforced word or
concept can die away. For example, because we process sounds in
sequence, neighborhoods of words starting with an initial he sound
will be activated when we hear he-. When we hear the rest of the
word hello, help will die away and hello, with its attendant meanings,
will be activated. . . . Like several pebbles thrown into a pond at once,
activation of different meanings causes interference with each one.67

First, there is a central issue with distinguishing primary definitions
from secondary ones, tertiary ones, and so on. Assuming they may be
triggered by the switching on of a “primary” node and then by
spreading to other, “secondary” nodes, there is no extant empirical
measure to conclusively establish which node is “primary.” Rather,
psycholinguistic researchers typically presume node primacy by
relational frequency: between two senses or meanings, that which is
more frequently used is presumed to be the “primary” sense or meaning.
That presumption fits imperfectly in trademark law in both the dilution
and genericness contexts.
With respect to genericness, it fits imperfectly, if only because a
measurement that takes no account of hybridized word marks will
generally undervalue the term’s “generic” sense in determining

66. See Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary
Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion, and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1019–20
(2001); Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP.
943, 946–47, 950 (2006).
67. Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 519–20 (citing, inter alia, JOHN R.
ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 183–85 (4th ed. 1995)). In the
above quotation, Tushnet sets forth the cognitive view tying spread activation to brand
association. However, it should be noted that Tushnet puts forward the view in order to discredit
it throughout the rest of her article. My quotation of her, then, should not be read to ascribe these
views to her. See also Christine A. Sevald & Gary S. Dell, The Sequential Cuing Effect in Speech
Production, 53 COGNITION 91, 110 (1994); Jerre B. Swann, Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002,
92 TRADEMARK REP. 585, 613 (2002).
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relational frequency. As discussed below, genericness surveys typically
ask consumers whether a given term is generic or source identifying,
presuming that a consumer who falls into one group does not fall into
the other. Like a set of hydraulic pistons, when one meaning goes up, it
is presumed that the other goes down. Hybridity illustrates the falsity of
this binary. But even if hybridity is accounted for, what results when
75% of the consuming public recognizes a particular term in both its
generic product and specific source senses?68 Any fine distinction at
that level would smack of arbitrariness.
One encounters similar problems with dilution. We could likely
establish relational primacy as between senior and junior mark holders
with respect to an individual term, but it is unclear why that should
override all the other senses and meanings a term carries. For example,
APPLE for computers may be first among mark holders, but it is
certainly not first among all meanings, or potentially even first within
all the markets in which the electronics company operates. (The
Beatles’ publishing arm, Apple Corps, might qualify in the music
market.) Things get even dicier when trying to deal with similar, as
opposed to the same, terms. Establishing primacy and tying it to
dilution and the primary significance test, then, is more fraught with
difficulty than it might seem.
Second, it is almost certainly far too strong to say that additional
senses or meanings “interfere” with others.69 Professor Tushnet, relying
on psychological research on linguistic association sets, notes that no
major brand names have high frequency levels in an absolute sense.70
Moreover, the evidence is unclear whether an increase in the number of
associations attached to a brand name might burden consumers’ ability
to retrieve or recognize the brand name.71 To the contrary, research
68. As possibilities for this hypothetical scenario, I suggest “vaseline,” “kleenex,” and
“xerox.”
69. See Zeelenberg et al., supra note 58, at 658 (citing L.W. Barsalou, Flexibility, Structure,
and Linguistic Vagary in Concepts: Manifestations of a Compositional System of Perceptual
Symbols, in THEORIES OF MEMORY 29 (Alan Collins et al. eds., 1993)) (“[A] feature-based
account [of language processing] needs to assume that not all semantic features of a word are
activated or attended to on each occasion a word is encountered. Instead, the degree to which
certain features are activated or attended to varies and depends on the context in which the word
is presented.”); see also C. Donald Morris et al., Levels of Processing Versus Transfer
Appropriate Processing, 16 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAVIOR 519 (1977); Diane
Pecher et al., Does Pizza Prime Coin? Perceptual Priming in Lexical Decision and
Pronunciation, 38 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 401 (1998); Henry L. Roediger III & Beth Adelson,
Semantic Specificity in Cued Recall, 8 MEMORY & COGNITION 65 (1980).
70. Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 534–35.
71. See id.
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suggests that such an increase may actually reinforce the retrieval and
the recognition of the primary association.72 Rather, all we can say is
that different meanings or senses may be activated, and this
“interference” may be negative or positive in terms of brand name
recall—we simply do not have a conclusive answer yet.
To some extent, the “interference” issue may simply be a failure of
language to accurately describe experience. Particularly in the legal and
scientific spheres, narrative structure and the process of measurement
force us to speak in terms of temporal sequence—first this happens,
then that. But it is not actually clear that is how the brain maps words to
meanings and senses, or senses to other senses.
3. Extrapolating Out: Measurement Issues
and Threshold Setting
With respect to dilution, there are at least three more related issues.
First, there is no convergence on whether certain measurements, such as
increased response time, are good proxies, if indeed they are proxies at
all, for increased “internal search costs.” Professor Tushnet describes
how “[u]nexpected results in studies of concrete versus abstract
words . . . show that there is a lot we still don’t know about what
response times mean and about the relationships between recall,
recognition, and production of words.”73
Second, assuming increased response time is an accurate proxy for
increases in internal search costs, current studies do a poor job of
accounting for the complexity of the relationship between context,
meaning, and these proxies—in Professor Tushnet’s words,
extrapolating “from lab to store.”74 In order to measure dilution in the
lab, researchers have found it necessary to decontextualize their
experimental scenarios.75 But these efforts inevitably end up missing
the point; because consumers almost always encounter trademarks in
72. Joan Meyers-Levy, The Influence of a Brand Name’s Association Set Size and Word
Frequency on Brand Memory, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 197, 202–03 (1989); see also Tushnet, Gone
in 60 Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 536 n.153 (citing Douglas L. Nelson et al., Interpreting the
Influence of Implicitly Activated Memories on Recall and Recognition, 105 PSYCH. REV. 299, 301
(1998)) (“In the end, association-set size may simply not be all that important in real-world
settings. Other studies suggest that context moderates any effect of association-set size.”).
73. Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 527–28 (citing Elizabeth Gudrais,
Neurons Sort Nouns, HARV. MAG., July–Aug. 2006, at 15, 16 (internal citations omitted)); see
also Simon Dennis & Michael S. Humphreys, A Context Noise Model of Episodic Word
Recognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 452, 464 (2001)).
74. See Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 527.
75. See id. at 528–32 (describing the decontextualizing effects of Morrin and Jacoby’s
attempts to measure dilution).
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context, finding dilution measurable in the lab in a decontextualized
scenario does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that dilution is
measurable in the real world.
Finally, assuming away the previous two issues, policymakers and
factfinders have not set a threshold for what might constitute actionable
dilution. As Professor Klerman has noted, even if we can agree that
studies showing increased response times have results that are
statistically significant (and, consistently replicable), and that these
studies are reliable proxies for increases in internal search costs, it does
not necessarily follow that these findings would be economically
significant.76 In other words, how might the harm of “whittling away”
goodwill be quantifiable such that harm could be proven? Brand
valuators have not been able to reliably measure goodwill writ-large
despite years of trying; it seems odd to say that, despite this fact, we
think it appropriate to base a legal claim on minute variations in
goodwill. Without a threshold, there is no baseline for harm, and
without a baseline for harm, there is no basis for distinguishing winning
and losing claims.77
II. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
A. “Sound, Sight, and Meaning”
The standard test for trademark infringement is whether the
defendant’s mark creates a “likelihood of confusion” in consumers’
minds with respect to the plaintiff’s mark.78 Per the Lanham Act,
confusion as to “affiliation, connection, or association” is actionable, as
is confusion as to “origin, sponsorship, or approval.”79
76. Klerman, supra note 19, at 1765 (arguing that a 125 millisecond increase in response time
is not economically significant); see DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS
OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 143–44 (1983) (distinguishing statistical and practical
significance), cited in Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 528 n.105.
77. This claim is no less true with respect to confusion. To say that “likely” confusion or
dilution is actionable requires that we set some consistent standard for measurement, no matter
how arbitrary it might be. See infra Part III.B.
78. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) (setting
forth a multifactor test to determine likelihood of confusion); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec.
Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (same); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 23.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). Many scholars have become increasingly convinced
that the basis for providing protection against many of these types of confusion is normatively
suspect. See, e.g., Lemley & McKenna, supra note 47; Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern
Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 83 (2009) (“[R]ecent research casts
serious doubt on a number of the assumptions on which the arguments [regarding confusion
harms] were based.”); see also Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90
VA. L. REV. 2099, 2119–22 (2009) (discussing extensions in actionable confusion).
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However, “likelihood of confusion” only makes sense if we have a
very tight conception of what “confusion” is, and how it arises.
Because the external search costs theory bears out fairly well
empirically,80 it seems acceptable as a measure of what actual
confusion is, but courts often get mixed up when trying to deal with
context. To their credit, courts try to incorporate examinations of
various types of context through the circuits’ various multifactor tests.
For example, the physical proximity of goods in the marketplace, as
well as the similarity of marketing channels—both of which are best
understood within the context of the single “proximity of goods”
factor—expressly deal with the physical and visual contexts in which
consumers are likely to encounter goods.
Drawing on Professor Beebe’s empirical work on the various
trademark infringement tests, it seems clear that there are only five
factors in these multifactor tests that actually affect trademark
infringement outcomes: similarity of the marks, proximity of the goods,
strength of the marks, intent, and actual confusion.81
Factfinders analyzing the similarity of the marks factor typically use
the “sound, sight, or meaning” test, which, in other words, compares the
marks with respect to similarity of “pronunciation, appearance, and
verbal translation.”82 When put together, this test is a fairly good way
to examine how similar marks might be through separate, but related,
inquiries. However, there are at least three issues with the test. First,
the test is disjunctive: similarity as to any one of sound, sight, or
meaning may suffice to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.83
80. See, e.g., Jean-Noel Kapferer, Brand Confusion: Empirical Study of a Legal Concept, 12
PSYCH. & MARKETING 551, 551, 564 (1995) (relying on the operational definition of confusion
used by courts to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion); Vincent-Wayne Mitchell &
Vassilios Papavassiliou, Marketing Causes and Implications of Consumer Confusion, 8 J.
PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 319, 319 (1999) (explaining consumer confusion based on stimuli
overload).
81. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1646–47 (2006) [hereinafter Beebe, Multifactor Tests].
82. See Watkins Prods., Inc. v. Sunway Fruit Prods., Inc., 311 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1962);
Sleeper Lounge Co. v. Bell Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1958); May Dep’t Stores Co. v.
Schloss Bros. & Co., 234 F.2d 879 (C.C.P.A. 1956); see also Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., 69
F.3d 1360 (7th Cir. 1995). See generally Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in
Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781 (2008) (discussing vagaries in how factfinders view the
sound, sight, and meaning inquiries). For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between
the “sound, sight, or meaning” test and semiotic theory, see Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of
Trademark Law, supra note 30, at 653–56.
83. See, e.g., Eveready Battery Co., Inc. v. Green Planet, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1511
(T.T.A.B. 2009); Interstate Brands Corp. v. McKee Foods Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910,
1913 (T.T.A.B. 2000); In re White Swan, Ltd., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1534, 1535 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
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Because a finding of similarity between the marks will often drive the
outcome of the overall likelihood of confusion inquiry,84 the standard
for finding similarity must be more attuned to how individuals actually
see these marks in circumstances of actual trademark use, rather than
abstracted from reality. Second, the meaning prong is far too
malleable.85 As hybridity illustrates, terms can carry a wide variety of
sometimes-conflicting meanings and senses, and consumers are more
than able to consistently disaggregate these meanings and senses where
appropriate context is provided. Finally, Professor Tushnet has
described how trademark law, and particularly the “sound, sight, or
meaning” test, exalts words over images in ways that both directly
affect how trademark images are perceived and distract from the reasons
marketers actually adopt particular marks.86
The “meaning” prong of the “sound, sight, or meaning” test should
be excised for the reasons stated above. Of the two remaining factors,
sight should be required to satisfy the plaintiff’s requirement to show a
similarity of the marks. As Professor Heymann has described,
“functionally illiterate consumers may not treat a mark as a word but
rather as a pictorial image, recognizable in subsequent encounters only
if the mark appears in the same color and font as in the previous
encounter.”87 With respect to literate consumers, and as described
above in Part I.B, we very often use visual keys to distinguish word
marks from each other. For example, laudatory and geographic word
marks, such as ACME and AMERICAN, respectively, are distinguishable
from each other not only by the markets in which they are used, but also
by the actual typefaces and colors used, as well as the logos in which

84. See Beebe, Multifactor Tests, supra note 81, at 1607.
85. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. Harvard Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075, 1078 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding that THE CURE FOR THE BLUES was
confusingly similar to BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD on the grounds that the marks conveyed the
same meaning to consumers); S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 185
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 573, 575 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (finding RAIN FRESH liquid detergent and RAIN
BARREL fabric softener confusingly similar); Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp. v. R.E. Robertson, Inc.,
9 F. Supp. 125, 125–26 (D. Mich. 1934) (determining WONDER MIX and MIRACLE WHIP, both
for salad dressing, were confusingly similar).
86. See Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in Trademark and Advertising
Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 865–83 (2011); see also Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark
Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263, 267 (2009) (“Mark
holders typically use word marks in tandem with colors because language facilitates certainty in
ways that are useful for commerce.”).
87. Heymann, supra note 82, at 791 (citing Madhubalan Viswanathan et al., Decision Making
and Coping of Functionally Illiterate Consumers and Some Implications for Marketing
Management, 69 J. MARKETING 15, 21, 27 (2005)).
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the terms are embedded. More detail means more capacity for source
identification. With respect to design and picture marks, including
stylized terms, similarity of appearance already controls.88 Therefore,
there would not be much of a change if my proposal set forth below89
regarding registration and protection of stylized terms were adopted.
Assuming that proposal is not adopted, requiring visual similarity and
broadly defining it to include the actual typefaces or coloring used by
the parties in actual trademark use scenarios could achieve similar
results.
B. Primary Significance and Genericness Surveys
Aspirin, escalator, cellophane, thermos: these terms were once all
very strong trademarks for use on their particular products.90 Over
time, the factors that made these marks strong eventually pushed them
into genericness.91 We usually use these terms to describe the fall into
genericness because they are iconic,92 but there are many more marks
we could add to this list. Although courts do not seem to have
examined the questions whether either KLEENEX or VASELINE are
generic, it seems fairly obvious that consumers actually consider these
terms to have a very high level of product significance even though
each has substantial source significance as well.93 This state of affairs, I

88. See, e.g., Farina Gegenuber Dem Julichs-Platz v. Chesebrough-Pond, Inc., 470 F.2d 1385,
1386 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (finding differences in “tulip” designs control); Alpha Corp. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 463 F.2d 1098, 1101 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (noting the differences in “eye” design
control); Lacoste Alligator S.A. v. Everlast World’s Boxing Headquarters, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
945, 948 (T.T.A.B. 1979) (finding a flying dragon for judo uniforms not confusingly similar to an
alligator for clothing); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 23:25. Notably, the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board uses an “eyeball” test to determine whether design marks are similar. See
Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act, supra note 86, at 876.
89. See infra Part III.A.
90. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co., v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963)
(thermos); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) (cellophane);
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (aspirin); Haughton Elevator Co. v.
Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1950) (escalator). See generally HarleyDavidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999) (“hog” for motorcycles); Murphy Door
Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989) (murphy bed); Henry Heide, Inc.
v. George Ziegler Co., 354 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1965) (jujubes); Dry Ice Corp. of Am. v. La. Dry
Ice Corp., 54 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1932) (dry ice); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am. Trampoline Co.,
193 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Iowa 1961) (trampoline).
91. See generally Timothy Denny Greene & Jeff Wilkerson, Understanding Trademark
Strength, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 535 (2013) (arguing for a more analytical theory for
understanding acquired trademark strength to provide guideposts for judges and eliminate
inconsistencies between jurisdictions).
92. See id.
93. See Best Global Brands 2012, INTERBRAND, http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-
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argue, has likely pushed these terms into de facto genericness.
As I have explained elsewhere, the doctrine of trademark strength—
which encompasses genericness—depends on at least six factors.94
These factors are: (1) inherent strength; (2) fame; (3) third-party uses;
(4) alternative generic signifiers; (5) brand extension and licensing; and
(6) lack of competition. To oversimplify the analysis some, KLEENEX
and VASELINE are relatively inherently strong95 and very famous word
marks.96 A review of federal trademark filings reveals that the terms
are rarely, if ever, used on third-party products or services. Each
product has a relatively strong alternative generic signifier—tissues for
KLEENEX and petroleum jelly for VASELINE. Each brand has been
extended by the owner into various adjacent product markets—hand
towels, dinner napkins, and moist towelettes for KLEENEX97 and various
types of lotions, lip balms, and the like for VASELINE.98
But consumer practice significantly minimizes those factors. People
commonly use “kleenex” and “vaseline” generically, and not simply to
describe things like KLEENEX or VASELINE.99 This is caused in large
part by ineffective competition in the relevant marketplace. A producer
who creates a single-player market—or something akin to it—is much
more likely to find her word mark has come to be used as the generic
signifier for the product on which the term is used. To analogize, there
is little effective competition in the search engine market, and as a result

brands/2012/Best-Global-Brands-2012-Brand-View.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (listing
KLEENEX as the eightieth most valuable global brand).
94. Greene & Wilkerson, supra note 91, passim.
95. KLEENEX is likely suggestive (it suggests, for example, how your nose will feel after using
one), and VASELINE is likely descriptive (it seems to be a combination of “wasser,” the German
word for water, and “elaion,” the Greek word for oil). See Vaseline, 5 MONTHLY REV. DENTAL
SURGERY 415, 415–416 (1877).
96. See INTERBRAND, supra note 93 and accompanying text (listing KLEENEX among the
world’s most valuable brands); J.D. POWER & ASSOCS., HOW THE VASELINE BRAND REMAINS
RELEVANT AFTER 125 YEARS (2010), available at http://images.dealer.com/jdpa/pdf/10-USVaseline-CS.pdf (utilizing social media research to discuss how the VASELINE brand remains
successful).
97. See Select a Product Category, KLEENEX, http://www.kleenex.com/Products.aspx (last
visited Sept. 22, 2013) (listing products marketed under the KLEENEX brand).
98. See Find the Right Products for Your Skin Care Needs: from the Vaseline Brand,
http://www.vaseline.us/products/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (listing products
marketed under the VASELINE brand).
99. See Ronald R. Butters, A Linguistic Look at Trademark Dilution, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 507, 514 (2008) (noting the phenomenon and dubbing terms like
“band-aid,” “kleenex,” and “xerox” pseudogenerics). The “things like” description is likely more
appropriate to describe terms like “google” used for searching, “scrabble” for a crossword board
game, or possibly “tetris” for a particular type of puzzle video game.
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of Google Inc.’s complete dominance, the verb “google” may reflect
making an internet search even apart from using Google Inc.’s search
service.100 But because there remain credible competitors in the
marketplace, like Yahoo! and Microsoft’s Bing, the word mark has not
become completely standardized as a generic term for “search” or
“search engine” despite its normalized usage as a verb. (It would be
odd to say you “googled” something on Bing, for example.)
To take a few more examples, that “vaseline” is synonymous with
petroleum jelly is often taken for granted in the U.S., and indeed, in
many countries throughout the world, “vaseline” is explicitly considered
generic for petroleum jelly.101 The almost complete lack of branded
competition for VASELINE in the U.S. contributes to its de facto generic
character in this country. Likewise, “kleenex” is routinely referred to in
the popular press as a generic term for tissues.102 In fact, “kleenex”
seems to be the news industry’s go-to example for describing a term
that has fallen into genericness.103 This analysis is no less true with
respect to terms like “teflon,” which was found to be not generic by a
court based on its source significance, despite a substantial showing of
product significance.104 The following Subparts will address how this
100. “Google” used as a verb was named the American Dialect Society’s “Word of the
Decade (2000–2009).” All of the Words of the Year, 1990 to Present, AM. DIALECT SOC’Y,
http://www.americandialect.org/woty/all-of-the-words-of-the-year-1990-to-present#2009
(last
visited Sept. 22, 2014).
101. See Vaseline, UNILEVER GLOBAL, http://www.unilever.co.za/brands-in-action/detail/
Vaseline/294658/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2014) (“Vaseline is still one of the best known and best
loved brands in the world. With products available in over 111 countries . . . .”).
102. See, e.g., Lionel Atwill, Get a Grip, FIELD & STREAM, Sept. 1997, at 76–78 (“The
‘thing’ [the Leatherman multi-tool] carried the name of its inventor, Tim Leatherman, and soon,
like Kleenex, the brand name became a generic term.”); Ian Crouch, A Word From Our Sponsors,
NEW YORKER, Jul. 13, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/a-word-from-oursponsors?mobify=0 (“For years, brand names have become absorbed into the language, shifting
from discrete proper nouns to regular common ones: Frisbee, Kleenex, Xerox, Band-aid.”); John
F. Infanger, Making Sims Affordable, AIRPORT BUS., Oct. 2010, at 16–17 (“We view simulator
more as a generic term now; like Band Aid or Kleenex. And really, it was a generic term until
FAA got a hold of it.”); Daniel McGinn, Setting a New Course, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19, 2007, at
E10 (describing Garmin’s marketing strategy: “The company’s executives . . . say that by
continually upgrading their devices, they’ll be able to defend their premium position, the same
way Apple’s IPOD far outsells lesser-known, less-expensive MP3 players. It’s reinforced this
message using advertising taglines like ‘Grab a Garmin’ and ‘Give a Garmin,’ which try to cast
its name, like Kleenex, as a generic term for the entire product category.”); Bill Morris, Explosion
of Brands and Erosion of Soul, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2012, at D1 (“[T]he Independence Bowl
became the Poulan/Weed Eater Independence Bowl, lovingly known as the Weed Whacker
Bowl. . . . ‘Over all, it was a net benefit,’ Evin Ellis, the company’s marketing communications
manager, [said]. ‘We consider Weed Eater the Kleenex of weed whacking.’”).
103. See Crouch, supra note 102.
104. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, 393 F. Supp. 502, 528 (E.D.N.Y 1975).
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state of affairs has come to be, and offer some observations on the
particular problems of the primary significance test and the way in
which courts address it through survey evidence.
1. Primary Significance
Recall from above that the primary significance test asks a binary
question: is the term generic or does it signify source?105 Next, does a
sufficient percentage of the relevant consuming public consider the term
generic, or does the relevant public instead consider the term to identify
source?106 But semantic ambiguity resolution research, as outlined
above, casts doubt on this binary question. To assume that a given term
may be used only in one sense or another is unnecessarily reductive and
does not accurately characterize how people actually understand
language. The test does not acknowledge that many consumers will
recognize both a generic and a source identifying meaning for a given
term (in addition to expressive and descriptive meanings related to the
term at issue).107 Just as we can understand the various meanings of
105. See Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words supra, note 11, at 1327–30
(surveying cases). For a great discussion of the historical origins of the primary significance test,
see Desai & Rierson, supra note 59, at 1820–25. As Professors Desai and Rierson note, some
courts have adopted the “who are you/what are you” test as an additional means of determining
whether a term is generic. See id. at 1825 (citing Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal
Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999); Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Certified Fraud Exam’rs, 41 F.3d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1995); CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis
Publ’ns, 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975); Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F.
Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 (E.D Wash. 2006); Eagle Snacks, Inc. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 625 F. Supp.
571, 581 (D.N.J. 1985)).
106. Butters, supra note 99, at 514 n.24. Butters argues that brand names used figuratively or
in shorthand references to product-referents typically have not actually become generic. Rather,
he argues word marks that have fallen into genericness have done so because “consumers actually
have lost all meaningful mental connection between the [word] mark and the company that has
been the source of origin of the product.” Id. He further notes, “[b]ecause of modern advertising
and marketing techniques, as well as vigilant legal policing by trademark holders, genericide
appears to be somewhat rare today.” Id. But his assertion is not quite correct: there is little
evidence that terms like “cellophane,” “shredded wheat,” or “thermos” retained only product
significance in consumers’ minds. The data from the first Teflon survey renders that argument
unpersuasive.
107. Nor do many courts or prominent commentators. See, e.g., Liquid Controls Corp. v.
Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A generic term is one that is
commonly used as the name of a kind of goods. . . . Unlike a trademark, which identifies the
source of a product, a generic term merely specifies the genus of which the particular product is a
species.”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 12:1, at 12-4 to -5 (footnotes omitted) (“The name of
a product or service itself—what it is—is the very antithesis of a mark. In short, a generic name
of a product can never function as a trademark to indicate origin. The terms ‘generic’ and
‘trademark’ are mutually exclusive.”). But see Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words,
supra note 11, at 1339 (footnote omitted) (“[A] trademarked word may be simultaneously hybrid:
that is, it may function for some consumers both as a generic term designating a product class and
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“fly,” given the appropriate context, so too can we understand a
trademarked term often used generically to signify both the product (a
thermos) and the brand (THERMOS). Semantic and visual context will
assist the consumer in choosing the correct interpretation, thereby
reducing ambiguity. The simple fact is that generic terms sometimes
act as marks, and word marks sometimes act as generic terms;
stylization and other context help the consumer determine which sense
or meaning she’s dealing with.
One might dispute this line of argument by differentiating knowledge
and use. That is, one could say even though a person—or a particular
community—calls all soft drinks “cokes,” she knows in her heart of
hearts that the term is not the actual generic descriptor for soft drinks.
Rather, it is instead a simple shortcut that eases the flow of
communication.108 Or even though she calls all copiers “xeroxes,” she
knows deep down that XEROX is a particular brand of copiers. The
problem with this line of argument is a general one with subjective tests
in various areas of the law: how can we ever really know what
someone’s level of knowledge is, or what the contents of their brain
are? Even neural scans can only tell us that a certain part of a person’s
brain was activated when some activity happened. In general, use is a
good proxy for knowledge in large part because people in most contexts
will not be “lying” about how to properly use a particular term. Further,
this argument also assumes that we can all agree that a single term
either is or must be the sole term for a particular product. But again,
this diverges from consumer practice. Is soft drink the only legitimate
term for “coke?” What about cola, pop, soda, and soda pop?
We should thus consider what the law should protect under these
conditions. A term can simultaneously connote a variety of different
meanings or senses, such as brand and generic (product) significance, as
well as meanings completely outside the bounds of commerce.109 The
question arises whether more (or fewer) word marks should be held
generic and thereby usable on competing products, subject to
appropriate means of differentiation—including clear designations of
source and different stylizations—to mediate any potential confusion.
Trademark hybridity might simply be a quick and simple argument for
at the same time as a source-significant, commercial symbol.”).
108. Query why calling all soft drinks “cokes” would ease that flow if it were not a widely
used generic descriptor for the product.
109. See supra Part I.B. For example, a consumer’s mental map for “Barbie” may include
barbecues (“put another shrimp on the barbie”) or a person who goes by that name as well as the
doll made by Mattel.
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never finding any word marks generic unless they have completely lost
all source identifying capacity.110
If that were how competitors acted in the marketplace, perhaps a
trend against finding marks generic would not pose a problem. But in
the context of monopolistic or nearly monopolistic markets—those in
which a single producer using a single word mark dominates the
market—producers will generally take anticompetitive positions to
solidify their market share and exclude new entrants.111 Even where the
average consumer understands a trademarked term to refer to both a
specific product created by a particular producer and the actual product
itself (in addition to any other senses in which the word may be used), a
rationally profit-maximizing producer will seek to expand its scope of
protection—often in unexpected ways112—to eliminate competition,
much to the detriment of consumers.113
In other words, the primary significance test is a hammer when a
chisel is needed. The test, applied as a binary, may either over or underprotect producers’ interests. The test will (a) find some word marks
generic where they still maintain source-identifying capacity and (b)
protect many others where they are used generically by a significant
110. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 59, at 1844–53 (proposing this outcome).
111. This outcome is the practical effect of the increased communication costs between
producers and consumers that the law and economics theory of trademark law attributes to
standardized generic terms. See Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 523 (1988); Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 295-96; see also Giovanni B.
Ramello, What’s in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory, 20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 547,
558–59 (2006) (“Consumer inertia is a crucial side effect of trademark, and can result in the
erection of barriers to entry. Firms are well aware of these inertial effects, which are in fact the
objective of creating brand loyalty, which seeks to endogenously generate and increase the
switching costs of consumers in order to achieve lock-in. Such practices have clear beneficial
effects on the profitability of firms which succeed in gaining market power, however their
ultimate social welfare effects are not so obvious.”) (citing DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND
EQUITY (Free Press 1991); Paul D. Klemperer, Competition When Consumers Have Switching
Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics and
International Trade, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 515–39 (1995)).
112. See Richard L. Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal
Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 305 (1978) (discussing “brand proliferation” in the corn flakes market,
whereby several firms produced the same product under many different brands, thereby reducing
the market’s potential profitability to competitors and effectively restricting their entry while
capturing the profits for themselves). On “brand proliferation” in the pharmaceutical market, see
Aidan Hollis, How Do Brands’ “Own Generics” Affect Pharmaceutical Prices?, 27 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 329 (2005); Ying Kong & James R. Seldon, Pseudo-Generic Products and Barriers to
Entry in Pharmaceutical Markets, 25 REV. INDUS. ORG. 71 (2004).
113. See Lunney, supra note 24, at 439 (“[U]nless some other efficiency gain can be tied to
extending protection in such cases, protecting marks based on their value independent of their
informational role risks creating monopolies, not merely in the neutral, descriptive sense, but in
the ordinary and pejorative sense of unjustified and inappropriate market power.”).
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percentage of the consuming public.
Walking through the implications of each scenario makes obvious the
harms of overprotection and the banality of under-protection. In
scenario (a), producers can still protect their interests through promoting
the other non-lexical attributes of their brands. Further, they generally
maintain protection against unfair competition and false advertising
when competitors attempt to appropriate those non-lexical attributes.
Consumers will undoubtedly find it easier to discover competing
products previously undiscoverable due to producers’ extension of their
trademark rights to maintain their market share. The threat of a suit due
to non-trademark uses of the term will be reduced as well, likewise to
consumers’ benefit.114
In scenario (b), producers are essentially given license to carve out a
swath of protection larger than their word mark merits. Consumers, on
the other hand, gain nothing. Their search costs are not reduced. These
costs may in fact increase, as competing producers must come up with
other ways to describe their products rather than using the term by
which the public knows the product.115 A consumer who does not
know how to ask for a “flying disc” will generally ask for a “frisbee,”
thereby potentially shifting profits from would-be competitors to the
rights holder and chilling competition in the market for frisbees.
It is inefficient to extend an artificial monopoly of indefinite duration
over a word that consumers use to refer to a class of products.116 That
arises, in part, out of search costs theory: if consumers in fact use a term
to describe a product within the class and care less—or not at all—about
the source, then the law’s artificial monopoly does not do any work. It
does not reduce search costs in the market by distinguishing products,
but rather by permitting only one distributor to offer the product at the
expense of potential competitors. As the Second Circuit once
114. This refocusing on consumer welfare echoes the Chicago School’s approach to antitrust
law, which, to brutally oversimplify, focuses primarily on protecting competition writ-large rather
than individual competitors. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (7th ed. 2007); see also Daniel A. Crane, Reviews, Chicago, PostChicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911 (2009) (discussing the rise of the Chicago
School); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925
(1979).
115. Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 291 (“If the producer of one brand could appropriate
the name of the product, he would earn rents because of the added cost to his rivals of
periphrasis—of describing their products as ‘heavier-than-air flying machines’ [airplanes] or
‘artificial-intelligence machines[]’ [computers]”); see also id. at 294–95 (discussing cost-benefit
balancing in the context of generic terms).
116. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 24, at 439.
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explained:
[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has
poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it
has achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive
competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article
by its name.117

Competitors who cannot speak their consumers’ language are at a
significant market disadvantage.
There is also a social cost. Our culture of relatively unconstrained
communication is threatened when noncommercial users, such as artists
and authors, are routinely subjected to spurious threats from mark
holders.118 While producers may myopically prefer such an outcome in
the short run as it allows them more control over their brand personae,
producers may—and often do—practically prefer their word marks to
be used generically, considering that cognitive psychology research has
shown that the more often we are exposed to a stimulus, the more likely
we are to come to prefer it.119 Further, even a word mark that has fallen
into genericness is still generally protectable against passing off120 and

117. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1976).
118. See Kim, supra note 32; see also John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An
Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868 (1984); Desai & Rierson, supra note 59;
Mark A. Lemley & Stacey L. Dogan, Parody as Brand (Stanford Public Law, Working Paper No.
2170498, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170498.
119. Jeremy N. Sheff, The (Boundedly) Rational Basis of Trademark Liability: Reconciling
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act with the Lanham Act, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 365
(2007); see also id. at 365 n.178 (citing Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G.
MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 397 (2002); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999)). This argument’s
impact is blunted, though not completely, by marketing studies finding that visual complexity of
the stimulus directly affects consumers’ preferences for that stimulus. See Dena Cox & Anthony
D. Cox, Beyond First Impressions: The Effects of Repeated Exposure on Consumer Liking of
Visually Complex and Simple Product Designs, 30 J. ACAD. MARKETING. SCI. 119 (2002)
(reporting a study finding that consumers’ aesthetic preferences for “visually complex” product
designs tended to increase with repeated exposure to the stimulus, while the opposite occurred for
“visually simple” product designs).
120. See, e.g., Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding that, although the HONEY BROWN ALE [word] mark was generic, defendant could still be
liable if it did not use “every reasonable means to prevent confusion” as to source (quoting
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 115 (1938))); Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded
Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1045 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[A] generic term with de
facto secondary meaning may be protected against passing off, e.g., by requiring fair notice that a
newcomer’s product or service does not come from the original source.”); PSK, L.L.C. v.
Hicklin, 757 F. Supp. 2d 836, 858 (N.D. Iowa 2010) (finding “overhead” generic in the context of
garage doors and nonetheless refusing to bar plaintiff’s § 43(a) passing off claim, reasoning relief
may be appropriate if the copier has not taken reasonable measures to protect against de facto
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false advertising.121 (Technically, these claims require de facto
secondary meaning, but that threshold would seem to be quite easily
satisfied in the case of a hybrid word mark.) Thus, while finding more
word marks generic may be tough medicine for producers in the short
run, it may inure to the benefit of consumers and producers in the long
run.122 The key to understanding why this is so is recognizing that the
term is only a single piece of the brand123: the VASELINE brand is not
simply the term “vaseline” but all the other things that go with it—the
squat jar, the blue label, the typeface—along with all of the positive (or
negative) associations attached to the brand.124 Broader use of the term
in diverse markets—or even in competitive markets—simply does not
pose much of a problem when other producers must still distinguish the
visual aspects of their marks from the initial producer’s mark.

confusion); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 12:48, at 12-201 to -202 (footnote omitted) (“In the
author’s opinion, in order to obtain some form of relief on a ‘passing off’ claim, the user of a
generic term must prove some false or confusing usage by the newcomer above and beyond mere
use of the generic name. This might include, for example, packaging or advertising words or
graphics which, in combination with the generic term, cause mistake or confusion as to source.”);
Desai & Rierson, supra note 59, at 1816–20 (cataloguing early cases and describing the doctrine
in more detail); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223 (2007).
121. See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 12:48, at 12-202 (citing E. Air Lines, Inc. v.
N.Y. Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)) (“In some cases, the kind of claim a
company has against a new competitor is not a ‘passing off’ claim, but a false advertising claim.
This occurs when a newcomer uses a generic term to falsely claim to be selling the same product
or service identified by that term as does the established company.”).
122. This argument directly contravenes accepted wisdom. See, e.g., BARTON BEEBE, ET AL.,
TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND BUSINESS TORTS 73 (2010) (“When a court declares
a trademark generic, it destroys a right built up with considerable investment.”). For further
elucidation of the majority view, see Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles,
90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2124 (2004) (arguing that the cost of a ruling that errantly denies trademark
protection is “much greater than the cost of a false positive error” because “erroneously failing to
protect the word when it in fact serves as a source-identifying mark might be very costly if
consumers end up confused about a competing firm’s product”); see also Desai & Rierson, supra
note 59, at 1833, 1844, 1846–49 (citing Professor Bone and making a similar argument). Two
points in response: First, as Professor Desai notes in his later work, trademarks are not brands,
and brands are where the value is. Rather, even if the term is held generic, the other aspects of
the brand remain protectable. Second, as noted above, the producer that markets its goods under
a generic trade name still retains protection against confusing uses via claims for false advertising
and passing off. As I argue below, the limited scope of protection afforded to these terms is
actually much better than the typical word mark from a speech and competition perspective and
should be adopted more broadly.
123. Google presumably recognized this when the company decided to “open-source[]” the
Android logo in order to promote consumer collaboration and engagement. Pagan Kennedy, Who
Made That? (Android Logo), N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 11, 2013, at MM17.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.
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2. Genericness Surveys
The prevailing genericness survey models, the Thermos and Teflon
models, are based on the faulty binary understanding of word marks
illustrated here and by Professors Folsom and Teply several decades
ago.125 In this Subpart, I briefly summarize both models and make
observations on where hybridity can help fill in gaps in the analysis.
The first type is the Thermos survey, the first of which was taken in
American Thermos Products Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc. to show that
“thermos” had become generic for vacuum flasks.126 The Thermos
survey tells respondents to imagine walking into a store and asking for
the product at issue. The defendant’s survey asked questions like:
Are you familiar with the type of container that is used to keep liquids,
like soup, coffee, tea and lemonade, hot or cold for a period of time?
If you were going to buy one of these containers tomorrow—that is,
the type that keeps food and beverages hot or cold—what type of store
would you select to make your purchase?
What would you ask for—that is, what would you tell the clerk you
wanted?127

Roughly 75% of the 3000 respondents said “thermos,” while 11% said
“vacuum bottle.”
These responses do not necessarily reflect what the respondents were
actually requesting. Some of those who asked for a thermos might have
preferred a THERMOS-brand vacuum bottle, but others might have
preferred any vacuum bottle. As Professor McCarthy explains:
[One] drawback of a “Thermos Survey” is that for a very strong
trademark, respondents with brand loyalty may answer with the
trademark and drop what they consider to be a generic name, because
it’s so obvious to them. For example, one of the 75% that answered
“Thermos” might say, “I said ‘Thermos’ because that’s the brand I
would buy. I don’t like those other inferior vacuum bottles.”128

But “brand loyalty” may not operate as strongly as Professor
McCarthy suggests for the reasons described above. And in any event,
it may not be necessary to trigger this response. Rather, as trademark
hybridity illustrates, it is entirely possible that the hypothetical

125. See Folsom & Teply, Surveying ‘Genericness,’ supra note 11; Folsom & Teply, A Reply
to Swann, supra note 11.
126. Am. Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1962), aff’d
sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
127. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 12:15, at 12-55 (providing an abridged version of the
Thermos survey from which the above quotation is taken).
128. Id. § 12:15, at 12-56 (footnotes omitted).
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respondent recognized “thermos” as both a brand and a generic term.
“THERMOS-brand thermoses” may seem redundant on first view, but is
completely comprehensible in context.129
The second type is the Teflon survey, the first of which was taken in
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida International Inc. to assist in
determining whether DuPont’s TEFLON word mark had become generic
for non-stick pans.130 The Teflon survey is basically a mini-course in
trademark genericness, followed by a series of questions to determine
whether the consumer thinks a given name is a brand name or a generic
name.131 The survey and results in Yoshida International follow:132
I’d like to read 8 names to you and get you to tell me whether you
think it is a brand name or a common name; by brand name, I mean a
word like Chevrolet which is made by one company; by common
name, I mean a word like automobile which is made by a number of
different companies. So if I were to ask you, “Is Chevrolet a brand
name or a common name?” what would you say?
Now, if I were to ask you, “Is washing machine a brand name or a
common name?,” what would you say?
[If respondent understands, continue. If not understand, explain
again.]
Now, would you say —— is a brand name or a common name?
Name
Brand %
Common %
Don’t Know %
STP
90
5
5
THERMOS
51
46
3
MARGARINE
9
91
1
TEFLON
68
31
2
JELLO
75
25
1
REFRIGERATOR
6
94
ASPIRIN
13
86
COKE
76
24
-

129. This argument should not be read to imply that brand loyalty is worthless in business
terms. Indeed, consumers often pay significantly more for brand name drugs despite the fact that
chemically identical generic versions of the drugs are often available. Rather, my argument is
that even the most loyal consumers are likely to recognize that a trademarked term’s meaning—in
conversation and in commerce—will often depend on the context in which the term is used. I
may love GOLD STAR-brand Cincinnati chili, but that doesn’t mean I’m necessarily going to be
confused as to whether “Gold Star Studios” in Los Angeles or “Gold Star Bar” in Chicago are
affiliated in any way with the company behind the chili.
130. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l, 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y 1975).
131. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 12:16, at 12-57.
132. The survey and results are adapted from 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 12:16, at 12-57
to -58.
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The Teflon survey utterly ignores trademark hybridity. Asking
consumers to select between “brand” and “common” presents a false
dichotomy. There is no reason why a given term, such as “teflon,”
cannot coexist as both a brand and a product (or something else)133 in
consumers’ minds. Were the survey to account for hybridity, a much
higher percentage of consumers than 31% would think “teflon” is a
generic term for non-stick pans or non-stick coating regardless of those
consumers’ knowledge of the TEFLON brand.
More generally, these surveys mistake language for being the sole
locus of interest in the analysis134 without appreciating the importance
of visual, spatial, and other contexts for distinguishing various senses or
meanings of the term at issue from each other. Southerners might think
“coke” is a perfectly acceptable generic term for all soft drinks, but
nonetheless may not find the meaning of “coke” ambiguous when
displayed in the flowery cursive script the company always uses on its
products. The surveys as designed are completely insensitive to this
type of context.
Even Professors Folsom and Teply’s models are relatively insensitive
to context, though they do a much better job of getting the linguistic
aspects of the inquiry correct.135 As they illustrate, it is fairly easy to
design a more accurate survey. Litigants should design a questionnaire
to discover whether a name is familiar as a brand, and a separate one to
discover whether it is familiar as a generic product name in order to
achieve independence on both meanings. Some words may be high on
one scale and low on the other, some may be high on both (like JELLO,
KLEENEX, XEROX, etc.), and some might be low on both if the term is
unfamiliar to consumers. There is no principled reason to force
consumers to definitively choose one meaning among multitudes.
By setting up the false dichotomy of “brand” and “product,” existing
surveys systematically favor the owners of word marks that may have
become de facto generic at the expense of competitors and the
consuming public. This preference for existing producers has real costs.
For example, trademarked terms can be used to stifle competition, and

133. John Gotti was nicknamed “The Teflon Don” after being acquitted three times in the
1980s, presumably because charges couldn’t stick to him.
134. Accord Desai & Rierson, supra note 59, at 1826 (“[T]he current doctrine overemphasizes the etymological categorization of words, rather than the core questions of (1)
whether the mark functions as a source-identifier in a commercial context, and (2) whether
trademark protection will help or hinder competition.”).
135. See Folsom & Teply, Surveying ‘Genericness,’ supra note 11; Folsom & Teply, Reply to
Swann, supra note 11.
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when the term is found generic, markets open up.136 The owners of the
MONOPOLY word mark at one point effectively used their rights to
restrict competition in the “monopoly game” market. When the Ninth
Circuit found “monopoly” generic for use on monopoly games in AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group,137 the market for these
games exploded. Amazon.com lists 1705 results (and counting) for
“monopoly” games, offered by a variety of producers, and including
dozens of versions of the game created by Hasbro, the current owner of
the MONOPOLY brand.138
When a producer monopolizes a word mark that has become generic,
competitors cannot find their consumers, and consumers cannot
effectively find those competitors’ products. If a consumer is not
sophisticated enough to know to look for a “real estate trading board
game” rather than “monopoly,” then comparative searching becomes
prohibitively difficult, if not impossible. Anti-Monopoly’s consumer
motivation test may have shot wide of the target, for reasons beyond
this Article’s scope,139 but it is difficult to question the benefits
consumers have realized on the backend.
As illustrated above, the Teflon and Thermos survey models make no
sense in light of trademark hybridity’s existence.140 Rather than outline

136. See Coverdale, supra note 118, at 870 (“It would clearly thwart the pro-competitive
purpose of trademark law to permit a producer to use trademarks to achieve monopolies over the
production or sale of uncopyrighted and unpatented products.”).
137. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Trademark Clarification Act of 1984 amended the Lanham Act to repudiate the “consumer
motivation” test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monopoly but did not abrogate the court’s
decision that “monopoly” was generic for “monopoly games.” Trademark Clarification Act of
1984, Pub. L. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (Nov. 8, 1984) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012)).
Apparently the MONOPOLY registrations were not actually canceled. See Parker Bros. v. Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1222, 1224 (T.T.A.B. 1984), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 757 F.2d 254 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Notwithstanding the [Ninth Circuit’s] decision,
[Parker Brothers’] registrations for the mark ‘MONOPOLY’ were not ordered to be cancelled
and, according to [PTO] records, are still active registrations.”). In any event, Hasbro does not
appear to be enforcing those registrations vigorously against various other –OPOLY
manufacturers.
138. I searched for [MONOPOLY] in the Toys & Games > Games > Board Games section of
Amazon.com on February 27, 2013, and found 1333 results. The first result was the classic
Monopoly game, with many other options available on the first page, including Monopoly
Nintendo, National Parks Monopoly, and Pirates of the Caribbean Monopoly. The result in the
text of this Article is current as of September 20, 2014.
139. For a discussion, see, e.g., Wayne F. Osoba, The Legislative Response to AntiMonopoly: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify the Genericness Doctrine, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 197
(1985).
140. Accord Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, supra note 11; Folsom & Teply,
Surveying ‘Genericness,’ supra note 11; Folsom & Teply, Reply to Swann, supra note 11.
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in detail here what an ideal genericness survey might look like, I leave
that to future work, keeping in mind that a proper survey must balance
competing policy concerns, such as the level of liability risk we expect
mark holders to bear and the pro-competitive purpose of trademark
law.141
C. Dilution
The Lanham Act protects famous marks against two types of
trademark dilution: (1) blurring; and (2) tarnishment.142 As some
scholars have noted, the alleged harms that arise from genericness and
dilution are thematically intertwined.143
Blurring reflects the idea that the presence of multiple uses of a term
in commerce, even in diverse markets, will tend to decrease the
consumer’s ability to recall the senior user’s word mark. In other
words, the consumer’s mental link between the term and the senior user
is “blurred” by the existence of another user’s use of the term.144 The
consumer whose mental representation of the term has been blurred
must “think for a moment”145 before the senior user comes to mind. In
other words, the consumer’s “imagination costs” have been raised,
which is generally assumed to be inefficient.146 The intuition is very
much tied up in the concept of free riding. For example, if a
restaurateur opens a Mexican restaurant and names it TIFFANY, the
141. Professor Craswell has examined similar issues in the false advertising context. See
Richard Craswell, “Compared to What?” The Use of Control Ads in Deceptive Advertising
Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 757 (1997).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). For arguments that dilution should not be actionable, see
Lunney, supra note 24; Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a
Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525 (1995); Tushnet, Gone in 60
Milliseconds, supra note 18.
143. See, e.g., Butters, supra note 99, at 515–18 (tying together the harms arising from the fall
into genericness and dilution); Desai & Rierson, supra note 59, at 1842–44 (discussing dilution
and “genericide”).
144. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 313 (2003)
(citing Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.2d 157 168 (3d
Cir. 2000)) (“Blurring occurs when the defendant’s use of its mark causes the public to no longer
associate the plaintiff’s famous mark with its goods or services . . . .”); Stacey L. Dogan, What is
Dilution, Anyway?, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 103, 105 (2006) (discussing blurring
in the context of the “likelihood of dilution” test); William M. Landes, Posner on Beanie Babies,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1761, 1765–68 (2007) (setting forth a formal economic model of blurring).
145. Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992).
146. Bradford, supra note 26, at 1278; Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 207. Beebe has
argued that the “search costs” description of antidilution law is, ironically, not what the concept
of “dilution” is all about. Rather, dilution is about maintaining trademarks’ (and other intellectual
properties’) ability to manufacture social distinction. See Beebe, Intellectual Property and the
Sumptuary Code, supra note 30, at 845–68.
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jewelry store may make two complaints: First, that the restaurateur is
attempting to siphon the jewelry store’s goodwill in lieu of developing
its own through repeated consumer interaction. Second, the jewelry
store will complain that the existence of another TIFFANY blurs the
consumer’s mental connection between the term and the jewelry store,
making the association between the goodwill and jewelry weaker, and
depleting the reservoir of goodwill.
Tarnishment is, in theory, much like blurring. The connotations the
consumer develops, however, are explicitly negative rather than
neutral.147 Thus, if instead of a restaurant, our entrepreneur opens up a
TIFFANY strip club, the jewelry store will argue that its mark (read:
brand image) is being tarnished by the term’s connection with a seedy
strip club. Courts generally only find tarnishment when the junior
user’s goods or services are related to sex.148 But as Professors Lemley
and Dogan have argued, many courts “seem to have misunderstood
tarnishment as ‘saying something bad about the trademark owner,’
rather than its proper meaning of ‘branding your own inferior or
noxious goods with the plaintiff’s [word] mark.’”149 Professor Beebe
similarly describes how tarnishment has expanded to govern uses that
simply lower the value of a producer’s goodwill or harm its
reputation.150
Tarnishment is tricky because the paradigmatic case of tarnishment—
the residual harm arising from an affective association between a term
or brand image and other irreconcilable or disagreeable values or
images—has at least some empirical basis.151 Professor Bradford,
drawing on cognitive psychology research, has argued that, while the
risk of negative perception may be heightened where consumers

147. See Landes, supra note 144, at 1768–69 (setting forth a formal economic model of
tarnishment).
148. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2010)
(creating a “rebuttable presumption” of tarnishment where the defendant has used the plaintiff’s
mark or a similar mark in association with sex-related products).
149. Lemley & Dogan, supra note 118, at 483; Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer DecisionMaking Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 134–36 (2012) (arguing this
misunderstanding of tarnishment is inherent in the concept itself).
150. See Beebe, Intellectual Property and the Sumptuary Code, supra note 30, at 858 (“Such
uses include, of course, dilutive copying that tarnishes the mark’s reputation for uniqueness,
regardless of whether that copying takes the form of ‘shoddy’ copies, and regardless of whether
that copying places the targeted mark in an ‘unwholesome or unsavory context.’”).
151. See Jennifer Aaker et al., When Good Brands Do Bad, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 13
(2004); Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Perception, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705, 743 (2005) (citing JOHN
O’SHAUGHNESSY & NICHOLAS JACKSON O’SHAUGHNESSY, PERSUASION IN ADVERTISING 64–
65 (2004)).
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attribute the inconsistent message to the senior user, this is not always
the case.152 Consumers may develop negative perceptions even when
they do not attribute the message to the senior user. To the extent that
tarnishment is limited to such harms, I have no conceptual issue with its
use.153 But when taken more broadly in the way Professors Dogan,
Lemley, and Beebe describe, tarnishment falls prey to the same issues
described below with respect to dilution by blurring.
As with generic terms, blurring’s alleged harms to consumers arise
from semantic ambiguity. The difference is that in most situations, a
word mark’s fall into genericness happens gradually and naturally.154
Usually, the term develops additional senses through no particular
affirmative acts of competitors, but instead through consumer linguistic
usage over time. By contrast, dilution by blurring is said to occur when
a separate business entity adopts another’s word mark as its own. In
other words, the new entity creates out of whole cloth an additional
meaning—a homonym—for the preexisting term. Recall the earlier
discussion of spreading activation.155 This theory posits that when a
term is heard or read, multiple meanings (or senses) of the term are
activated—most wrong, at least one right. The research described
above shows people resolve these semantically ambiguous situations by
using contextual clues to make a particular judgment about how to
interpret the term, often before the sentence is even finished.156
Consumers are therefore constantly dealing with semantic ambiguity.
And they deal with it quite well given detail and context.
That consumers are so accustomed to dealing with this type of
ambiguity should be a sign that blurring’s purported harms, if they exist,
are relatively minor in empirical terms. Recall that research suggests
that such an increase in semantic associations may, contrary to the
internal search costs theory, reinforce rather than inhibit retrieval and
recognition of the primary association.157 Blurring and tarnishment
imply interference, but it is not so clear that the addition of new senses
152. Id. at 756.
153. Although I note that, notwithstanding such actual harm, there may be other normative
reasons such as our commitment to freedom of expression that may call into question the
desirability of providing producers recourse against tarnishment.
154. Recognizing the market gains to be had, many mark holders try to render their word
marks de facto generic. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing the marketing
approaches taken with respect to the Leatherman multi-use tool and Garmin GPS).
155. See supra Part I.B.
156. See, e.g., Stephani Foraker & Gregory L. Murphy, Polysemy in Sentence
Comprehension: Effects of Meaning Dominance, 67 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 407 (2012).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 55–77.
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and meanings are negative; rather, they may be positive and
productive.158 The addition of new senses and meanings may not be
“death by a thousand cuts”159 then, but instead more akin to a snowball
forever rolling down a hill.
Indeed, even if the internal search costs model bears out empirically,
it is not clear whether the law should care. Trademark law allows
businesses to broadly adopt laudatory word marks, such as “Acme” or
“Gold Star,” and geographic word marks, such as “American,” which
complicates the case for dilution by blurring. American Airlines
maintains a very strong brand in the airline industry, as does American
Recordings in the music industry. So, we broadly permit multiple
“American” marks in various industries, as well as a variety of
businesses using terms like “Gold Star.” Is the issue that we do not care
whether there is blurring in these situations, or is it that we do not know
how blurring will affect business? As Professor Tushnet notes, studies
on brand extensions that flopped have borne out the conclusion that
consumers’ mental conceptions of individual brands are remarkably
robust, which suggests these conceptions have little effect on future
purchasing decisions.160 If blurring occurs, then, we would have to see
it happen en masse with dozens, possibly even hundreds or thousands of
businesses adopting the same term before seeing any major effect on
purchasing decisions. And as noted below, this has not occurred yet—
and in any event seems unlikely to occur.
The case is further complicated when we consider the case of
arbitrary word marks. Do my bad experiences with royal gala apples
taint my relationship with my iPod? Does my palpable dislike of the

158. See id.
159. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 24:120, at 24-415 to -416 (“Like being stung by a
hundred bees, significant injury is caused by the cumulative effect, not by just one. Or, that like a
death by a thousand small cuts, or the wood worker whittling, the first small cut will necessarily
be the first of many that will whittle away the strength of the famous mark.”).
160. See Anna Kirmani et al., The Ownership Effect in Consumer Responses to Brand Line
Stretches, J. MARKETING 88, 99 (1999); Deborah Roedder John et al., The Negative Impact of
Extensions: Can Flagship Products Be Diluted?, J. MARKETING 19, 20 (1998); Tushnet, Gone in
Sixty Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 543 & nn.176–77 (citing, inter alia, Stephen J. Hoch,
Product Experience Is Seductive, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 448, 451 (2008); Nicole L. Votolato &
H. Rao Unnava, Spillover of Negative Information on Brand Alliances, 16 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 196, 201 (2006)) (describing research showing “that dilution by tarnishment through
the use of a similar mark on a shoddy product is unlikely in the absence of source confusion
because consumers have robust mental concepts of strong brands. If consumers are given a
reason to distinguish an authorized extension or cobranded product from the core brand . . . they
will do so, and negative opinions about the extension will not return to harm opinions of the core
brand”).
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Phoenix Suns161 make me less likely to use software developed by Sun
Microsystems? Extending the argument outside of trademark law
makes clear just how banal the purported dilution harm actually is.
Does the fact that I have ten friends named John necessarily mean that I
cannot help but constantly confuse them with each other, or have my
negative experiences with one contaminate my feelings for the others?
The simple term itself—“apple,” “sun,” or “John”—isn’t adequate to
capture the full measure of our experiences.
Hybridity bears on these questions because their relatively obvious
absurdity illustrates this Article’s key point: context matters. In order to
“whittle away” at a brand’s goodwill, the alleged diluter’s trademark
must bear a much tighter resemblance to the famous mark in every way
rather than simply being a use of the same or a similar term. And even
then, the robustness Professor Tushnet describes may render the harm
illusory.
Finally, as noted above, the law has no threshold for what “harm”
should be, should such harm exist. An increased response time that
does not result in any type of tangible harm like a lost sale seems rather
de minimis in the larger scheme of things. Further, the other aspects of
the brand, including trade dress, logos, and positive (or negative)
affective responses to that brand are significant additional confounding
factors. Even if we agree that some particular threshold of increased
response time is statistically—and economically—significant when
controlling just for the word mark itself, researchers who find such an
increase will tend to elide the distinctions consumers make that arise in
actual trademark use in order to isolate the harm for measurement.162
But by taking away the context, these researchers also render toothless
the quality of those measurements as means of proving real harm.
Dilution by blurring can be justified as a bulwark against unfair
competition, but realistically it can only be done to the extent that there
is confusion due to the contextual proximity of the trademarks in terms
of typeface, term, product category, or design, among others. Blurring
161. Author’s Disclosure: I’m a Golden State Warriors fan.
162. See Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 531 n.123 (critiquing other
studies on similar grounds). Compare Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution:
Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265 (2000)
(conducting a stylized experiment in which exposure to dilutive ads led to an average of 770
milliseconds before respondents could recognize the senior mark as fitting within a product
category, as opposed to 748 milliseconds for the control group), with Tushnet, Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds, supra note 18, at 531 (critiquing Morrin & Jacoby’s experiment on the grounds that
the environment potentially “was itself decontextualizing, depriving subjects of the cues they
would ordinarily use to distinguish a dilutive use from a senior mark.”).
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thus unravels into confusion, which itself breaks down under linguistic
analysis into a simple claim for passing off as unfair competition. Clear
context delivers us from ambiguity; unclear context results in harm, but
the harm arises from consumers thinking Producer A’s goods came from
Producer B (or vice versa). Unfair competition law is already around to
deal with that harm.
None of the above should be taken as absolute proof against the
existence of some type of dilution-like harm. Rather, the claim is a
more limited one: for the reasons stated above, cognitive science and
psycholinguistics do not provide the basis for a full-throated defense of
dilution by blurring.163 The current legal framework does not
sufficiently describe what dilution is, how to measure it, or how much
of it is necessary to support a cause of action. Courts have, for the most
part, implicitly recognized the claim’s theoretical failure and, according
to Professor Beebe and others, have relegated these claims to the
dustbin.164 But antidulution law has effects beyond the judicial system.
Most overreaching behavior takes place in the shadow of the law
through cease-and-desist letters and other bottom-up approaches. It is
unlikely most recipients of an overbroad cease-and-desist letter would
understand the nuanced approach—verging on outright hostility—
courts have taken to dilution claims. Rather, they are likely to see the
claim, the citation to and quotation of the statute, and simply fold
because they cannot afford to challenge it or because their knowledge of
the law is incomplete.165 The statute’s mere existence thus causes
significant problems.
Efforts to protect the producers of products bearing famous marks,
should we find them necessary, should be explicit, acknowledging full-

163. Accord Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds, supra note 18.
164. See Beebe, Intellectual Property and the Sumptuary Code, supra note 30, at 849 nn.202–
03 (citing Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the
First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 449 (2008); William Michael Darling, Depreciation in Canadian Trade-Mark Law: A
Remedy in Search of a Wrong, 21 INTELL. PROP. J. 49, 72 (2007); Dev Gangjee, The
Polymorphism of Trademark Dilution in India, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 611, 611
(2008); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2006); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark
Dilution in Japan, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228, 231 (2006)). Beebe argues that this
failure to garner favor is due to the “economistic” turn in trademark law and the seeming
insignificance of whatever effects an increase in “internal search costs” might have on consumer
decision-making. Id. at 849.
165. Cf. COOMBE, supra note 16, at 9 (“People’s imagination of what ‘the law says’ may be a
shaping force in those expressive activities that potentially violate it and in those practices that
might be considered protected acts of ‘speech,’ constitutionally defined. People’s anticipations of
law . . . may actually shape law and the property rights it protects.”).
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well what we are granting is a strong, broad, exclusive property interest
in a word or phrase.166 And we should only grant such a right if we
fully understand the extent to which those producers will, quite
rationally, seek to expand it. We must also understand how producers
will use that expanded protection as a new lower baseline in order to
continue expanding the scope of protection afforded their marks. In my
view, the better approach would be to simply jettison this part of the
statute given the high costs and potential for anti-consumer and antispeech behavior on the part of mark holders. Should future research
bear out an actual harm that is consistently replicable, if scientists,
factfinders, and policymakers can agree on an appropriate threshold for
the claim, and, perhaps most importantly from a practical perspective,
these surveys can be run cost effectively in the course of the average
litigation, antidilution protection might then merit consideration. In the
alternative, we can at least push for a clearer understanding of what
dilution is, how much is necessary to support a suit, and how we
measure that amount.
D. Market Competition
Many scholars have argued that permitting exclusive control over
generic and hybridized word marks167 can impose significant societal
costs, including the creation (or prolonging) of a market monopoly.168
166. Property-like exclusive rights are not inherently problematic. However, they are
problematic where they are broad and relatively unlimited. On this point, see Michael A. Carrier,
Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004).
167. This Subpart focuses primarily on the competitive effects of protecting generic or
hybridized word marks against a finding of genericness. Antidilution protection’s effect on the
overall product market is less direct because, at least in theory, the cause of action provides
recourse primarily against non-competitors. And where the market is, again in theory, for the
particular brand itself rather than the products either producer makes, the calculation of efficiency
gains and losses become murkier, and the moral rights concerns that seem to drive antidilution
protection become more obviously salient. As this Article demonstrates, the “efficiency gains”
netted by the internal search costs theory are more ephemeral than real. A formal economic
analysis of antidilution protection’s effect on market competition in light of hybridity is beyond
the scope of this Article, if only for space reasons. Nonetheless, the concerns voiced in the latter
half of this Subpart apply equally in the dilution context.
168. See Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, supra note 11, at 1340–46. Among
other costs to competition, Folsom and Teply describe the difficulty of “assur[ing] consumers that
[a competitor’s product is] in the product-category covered by the trademarked generic word, so
that consumers’ search costs may be reduced, experience purchases encouraged, and the
perceived risks decreased.” Id. at 1344. Remedies to these problems include adopting an
alternative generic signifier (which often doesn’t work because the alternative names are too
technical, unfamiliar, or simply cannot convey the level of information necessary), point-of-sale
advertising and packaging (which doesn’t work when dealing with services and many other
experience goods), and licensing. Id. at 1344–45. However all of the alternatives are very costly
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As Professors Folsom and Teply explained:
[P]roducers of goods are under a strong economic incentive to select a
generic word as their trademark or to encourage consumers to adopt
their trademark as a household term. Generic use of a trademark in
advertising is thought to be a desirable marketing strategy because it
excludes all mention of competing brands and even suggests their
nonexistence. Moreover, the use of generic words as trademarks
increases search costs because consumers may be unable to determine
whether potentially competing products are within the same product
category or whether they have the same general characteristics
associated with the trademarked generic word. In this way, the use of
generic words as trademarks creates an entry barrier that enhances the
ability of the firm holding the generic mark to charge
supracompetitive prices.169

To blunt this tendency, many scholars have advocated a genericness
doctrine focused on the competitive effects of allowing an allegedly
generic term to continue to be used as a trademark.170 This conceit
should be no less applicable in those situations where a particular word
mark carries different meanings in different contexts.171 But nearly all
words—trademarks or not—carry varied meanings and senses.
Privileging some meanings or senses over others makes little sense
outside of a pure investment protection rationale.
Most scholars would likely agree that creating and prolonging market
monopolies is a net negative, and that in those circumstances where
consumers literally do not know how to ask for a product without using
a term that has been granted trademark status—”monopoly,” “yo-yo,”
“thermos,” among others—the answer to the question whether finding a
and potentially ineffective due to the same type of first-mover disadvantage problems that
necessitate the class action system or that make many large-scale–public-oriented innovations like
the Google Book Project nearly impossible to accomplish. See Randal C. Picker, Access and the
Public Domain, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1183, 1206 (2012) (“Of course, Google doesn’t want to
face a first-mover disadvantage where it bears the cost of scanning and then second movers free
ride on those scans.”).
169. Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, supra note 11, at 1337.
170. See, e.g., Coverdale, supra note 118, at 880–81 (citing Am. Chicle Co. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1953)) (“Rather than ending with the narrow
lexicological inquiry mandated by the primary significance test, a court faced with a genericness
case should seek to balance the conflicting interests of the trademark holder, the alleged infringer,
and the public in the manner that most tends to foster competition in the relevant product
market.”); see also Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, supra note 11, at 1352 (“Will
market transactions proceed more efficiently if the trademark holder is permitted exclusive use of
the mark, or will they proceed less efficiently?”).
171. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 59, at 1849 (“[T]he issue raised in allowing one
company to claim a [generic or hybrid] term as its trademark is better addressed by focusing on
the way language evolves and whether the term is necessary for competition.”).
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word mark generic will improve competition in the marketplace should
be relatively simple. Unfortunately, it is not.
As Professors Lemley and McKenna argue, as well as Professor
Kaplow, on whose work many of their arguments are based,172 linedrawing is so difficult as to lead to conclusions that seem not so much
reasoned as entirely arbitrary.173 When does “monopoly” become a
specific type of game as opposed to just another board game?174 When
is a “ring pop” a particular type of lollipop as opposed to just another
entrant in the greater lollipop market?175 Comparative advertising
should be able to take care of the problem by permitting competitors to
note that their products are similar to others’ (house brands often do
this, as any visit to Walgreen’s or CVS Pharmacy will show the reader)
or in the style of others’, but it often doesn’t help much in the real world
where legal threats generally occur in the shadow of the law.
As Professors Desai and Rierson note, unambiguously generic terms
are not often identified or involved in litigation.176 As a result, the
question of whether a particular term is “necessary for competition” or
whether finding a term generic would generally improve competition
still requires factfinders to make a policy decision as to the breadth of
the market. And even then, goods and services often compete across
product categories—cinnamon rolls are in some sense competing with
danishes in the “breakfast dessert” category, as well as ice cream in the
overall “dessert” category, not to mention banana bread in the “baked
goods” category. As Professors Lemley and McKenna note, plaintiffs
will generally argue for broad market definitions, defendants for narrow
ones.177 How can we draw the line consistently?

172. See Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the Conflation of Empirical
Assessments and Legal Policy Judgments, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 243 (2011); Louis
Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010).
173. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market
Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2066–68, 2075–77 (2012).
174. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983) (discussing whether, as applied to board games, the word
“Monopoly” had become “generic”).
175. See Topps Co., Inc. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 CIV. 7302 (RWS), 1996 WL
719381, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1996) (finding, in a case involving an aesthetic functionality
defense, that “[d]iamond engagement [ring] shaped lollipops do not constitute a distinct product
line within the candy industry”).
176. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 59, at 1827; George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (describing case selection
effects, and noting that the cases that make it to verdict or appeal are neither “a random nor a
representative sample of the set of all disputes”).
177. See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 173.
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The fact of the matter is that much of current trademark enforcement
is focused on carving up markets, rather than reducing consumers’
search costs. The advent of the coexistence agreement provides a
particularly compelling example of this fact. A coexistence agreement
is an agreement between two mark holders using the same or a similar
term on different goods or services.178 Usually, depending on which
party has priority—and thus increased bargaining power—the parties
will divide up their existing and potential markets. The typical example
is the erstwhile coexistence agreement between Apple Inc., the
computer and electronics company, and Apple Corps, the Beatles’
record label, which limited Apple Inc.’s ability to move into the music
business.179
Though coexistence agreements have been held not to violate the
Sherman Act, and despite the Second Circuit’s characterization of such
agreements as “a means by which parties agree to market products in a
way that reduces the likelihood of consumer confusion,”180 they often
pay little more than lip service to consumer interests. A particularly
ripe example that puts the lie to the Seventh Circuit’s characterization is
the case of California Fruit Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co.181
In this case, the Seventh Circuit addressed the impact of a coexistence
agreement on third party litigation. Two parties, one that used SUNKIST
on citrus fruit and one that used SUN-KIST on canned fruit and
vegetables, entered into a coexistence agreement in which they
consented to the other’s usage of the term on their respective goods.
Together, they filed suit against a bakery using the word mark SUNKIST
for bread. The panel relied in part on the consent agreement to support
its finding of no likely confusion.182

178. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 18:79, at 18-200 to -04 (describing “consent to use”
agreements).
179. Though once Apple Inc. started to do so with the iPod and iTunes, the parties’ agreement
fell apart and the parties entered litigation. See id. at 202 n.3 (describing Apple Inc. and Apple
Corps’ contentious litigation and later settlement).
180. See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 60 (2d Cir. 1997). The Court of
Appeals also noted that coexistence agreements are also used as cost-saving efforts to avoid—or
quell—disputes between the parties.
181. See Cal. Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1947).
182. Judge Minton’s opinion is worth quoting at length:
We are supposed to believe that when a customer bought fruits or vegetables under the
name “Sunkist,” he was not confused as to whether the fruit came from the California
Fruit Growers Exchange or the vegetables from the California Packing Corporation;
but if he bought a loaf of bread under the name “Sunkist,” he was likely to think that he
bought it from one or the other of the plaintiffs because they sold fruits and vegetables,
but never bread. . . . [W]e shall ask to be excused when we are admonished by these

GREENE PRINT FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

122

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/4/2014 1:57 PM

[Vol. 46

Given the prevalence of arms-length contracting that takes little
actual account of consumer confusion—or dilution—except as a proxy
for reducing competition between the parties by clearly dividing up
markets, we might worry about those same parties paying similar lip
service to consumer interests in litigation as well.
This is all to say that determining whether one outcome or another
promotes or harms competition is fraught with difficulty and plagued by
producer self-interest. As a result, I propose limiting the scope of
trademark subject matter protection for word marks to stylized terms, or
alternatively, requiring exact linguistic identity as a prerequisite for a
finding of confusing similarity with a strict market requirement, as I
describe in more detail below.
III. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS AND PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM183
In addition to the proposals made throughout this Article, there are at
least two more ways trademark law can account for hybridity. First, by
rethinking the basis for registering and protecting plain word marks
unconnected to a design or logo. Second, by limiting the type and scope
of control a mark holder can claim to hold over the expressive meanings
that may have attached to a particular mark.
A. Rethinking Registration and Protection
of Plain Word Marks
Given that word marks are parts of language writ-large, most, if not
all, word marks are understandable as source identifiers only in
connection with the context in which they arise.184 If an Australian
immigrant visiting your house for a backyard party asks you where the
“barbie” is, you are not likely to point him toward your daughter’s
dollhouse. To better address the importance of context, I propose that
registration should be allowed only for stylized terms.185 Litigants
should be subject to the added requirement of illustrating, among other

dividers of confusion by contract to hear their vice president and advertising manager
shout confusion on behalf of the purchasing public.
Id. at 975.
183. I do not include here a formal proposal to get rid of trademark dilution merely because
that argument has been made continuously throughout this Article.
184. See supra Part I.
185. See Lee et al., supra note 8, at 1059 (noting that when courts examine marks for
distinctiveness, they tend to disregard contextual indicators and focus solely on semantic
distinctions).
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things, how the stylized term/logo is used on actual packaging and how
it is displayed in the store. Allowing registration or protection of the
term alone simply grants far too broad of an exclusive right to justify
the costs imposed on competitors and consumers, borne in the form of
overbroad cease and desist letters and threats of litigation. Coupled
with a stronger trademark misuse doctrine186 and more vigorous fee
shifting for unmeritorious claims, such an approach could go a long way
toward reducing overbroad claims.
In the alternative, trademark law should at least require exact
linguistic identity for confusion with respect to plain word marks, and
only with respect to directly competitive goods.187 By limiting
opportunities to find a likelihood of confusion to those situations in
which consumers are most likely to be confused, the law can avoid
much of the mischief that accompanies a muddier, more uncertain
approach to these questions. This more moderate proposal also finds
support in the broader, non-registration-based case law.188
186. See William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1547 (2006) (arguing for the implementation of the doctrine of trademark misuse and
permitting liability to fall on both the alleged infringer and the trademark holder).
187. This is the approach the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has taken with respect to
stylized generic terms. E.g. Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 1566
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A logo registration] protects only the particular manner in which [the
registrant] displays the word ‘sweats.’ . . . [T]he registrant’s rights would reside solely in the
particular style of display of the words.”); In re Grand Metro. Foodserv., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1974, 1976 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (permitting registration of a distinctive display of the word
MUFFUNS for muffins); In re Venturi, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 714, 718 (T.T.A.B. 1977)
(permitting registration of distinctive display of THE PIPE for smokers’ pipes); In re Trail-R-Van,
Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 590, 591 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (TRAIL-R-VAN in distinctive geometric
design held registrable despite “trailer van” being generic for truck bodies); see 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 25, § 12:40, at 12-159 to -68.Moreover, courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board often apply a similar rule when applying the “sound, sight, and meaning” test discussed
below. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that a word
mark must be considered as a whole, rather than as dissected into individual parts); Massey Junior
Coll., Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 492 F.2d 1399, 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
188. See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th
Cir. 1999) (reaffirming the Ninth Circuit’s “anti-dissection” rule for evaluating the trademark
validity of composite terms); Cal. Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, Ltd., 774 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th
Cir. 1985) (“California Cooler’s mark is a composite term, and its validity is not judged by an
examination of its parts. Rather, the validity of a trademark is to be determined by viewing the
trademark as a whole. . . . Thus, the composite may become a distinguishing mark even though
its components individually cannot.”).This change would also return trademark infringement to
its early twentieth-century roots. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167 n.13 (2006) (citing
Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912)) (noting that
early trademark infringement doctrine “requir[ed] not only that the mark at issue qualify as a
trademark, but also that the infringer use a virtually identical mark on a directly competing
product”).
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One major counterargument to this proposal is the risk of a slippery
slope: won’t everyone move quickly to register a famous term in diverse
areas in an attempt to free ride off of the famous user’s goodwill? To
counter this counterargument, I make four points.
First, strong word marks may properly be allowed a broader scope of
protection than weaker marks because consumers are generally more
likely to become confused when those marks are used on less directly
competitive goods and services than when weaker marks are so used.
For example, while Google may properly be granted a large scope of
exclusion in search and adjacent internet markets, the company’s ability
to preclude other users from using similar terms would not alone extend
to the Mexican restaurant market, absent other indicia of passing off,
such as a similar typeface or rainbow coloring for letters in the term.
Who thinks the Mexican restaurant is affiliated with Google unless it
takes on the entire image? As strong word marks would seem to be
those at most risk of being free-ridden upon, any worries about boxing
in the competition would likely be misdirected.
Second, the slippery slope does not happen in practice, and did not
happen even when most state and federal laws did not offer antidilution
protection. As Professors Heald and Brauneis have shown through
extensive empirical research, prior to Congress’ passage of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act in 1996, there is no evidence that unauthorized
uses of famous word marks as product names—such as BUICK aspirin—
were ever a problem.189
Third, as addressed above and more fully in Professor Desai’s work,
today is an age of branding, where the prime value is in developing an
affective connection with the consumer, thereby promoting brand
loyalty.190 Businesses that are not trying to pass off their goods as those
of others—which, again, violates the Lanham Act and state unfair

189. Paul J. Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of
Trademark Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2533 (2011). The
authors did find some evidence of unauthorized uses of famous word marks as trade names, such
as ROLLS ROYCE REALTY, but these uses were “sporadic” and “local.” The “death by a thousand
cuts” world proposed by antidilution proponents simply never happened, even in the cases of
CADILLAC and HARVARD, which were by far the most often used of the word marks studied.
Further, as Professors Heald and Brauneis note, most of the uses of this kind were of terms that
could quite clearly be seen as self-laudatory—that is, “Rolls Royce” used in the sense of “highquality” rather than “the car company.” Hypotheticals are great for some purposes, but not as an
allegedly empirical basis for justifying broad exclusive property rights. Useful perhaps for
delineating the scope of a right already justified by other means, but not for deciding whether to
grant the right in the first place.
190. See Desai, supra note 26.
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competition laws—will tend to avoid overgrazing already popular terms
if only because many mark holders commonly misconceive of
hybridity. That is, they think it becomes harder to internalize the value
arising from consumers’ accruing brand loyalty when another producer
has already adopted the term for use on its own goods or services.
Thus, there is—or at least, there is seen to be—value in differentiation
for differentiation’s sake.
Finally, the slippery slope argument simply misunderstands hybridity
and how language works. As illustrated above, additional senses and
meanings are added into our mental conceptions of individual terms and
do not crowd out preexisting meanings and senses.191 New meanings
and senses instead become enmeshed in that mental conception. This is
why the existence of dozens of different AMERICAN or GOLD STAR (or
SMITH) word marks is not terribly confusing, even if the impetus behind
limiting the scope of geographical and laudatory marks does not come
from a place of reducing confusion. Rather, trademark law constricts
the scope of protection afforded to these terms to very constrained
markets, and often to particular stylizations of those terms. The sky has
not fallen, nor is it likely to. This approach should be applied more
broadly.
B. Limiting Control over Emergent Expressive Meanings
Trademarked terms almost always signify a variety of different
meanings. Generally, one of these meanings will be the trademark’s
traditional source-identifying meaning (Barbie being the fashion doll
made by Mattel). But, especially with respect to very well known
marks, the term will often develop other related senses, some of which
may be relevant to trademark scope (for example, Barbie being any
female fashion doll), many of which may not (Barbie being the idea of a
shallow, materialistic woman).
As many scholars have noted,
trademarks and logos are fundamental building blocks of modern
cultural communication.192 We use trademarks and logos like we do
other pop culture ephemera: to develop and maintain social
relationships and to express ourselves through broadly understandable

191. See supra Part I.B.
192. There is a rich literature on this point. For particularly influential examples, see
COOMBE, supra note 16; Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 3, at 406–10 (noting the
shift in trademark protection to a property approach, and describing how this shift legally limits
opportunities for expressive use of trademarks); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999); see also Desai & Rierson, supra note 59.
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media. By adopting the corporate-based brand view of trademarks193—
which, as noted above and as illustrated more fully by Professor Desai,
grants broad rights to producers at the consumer’s expense—we allow a
climate of private censorship to develop. I am certainly not the first to
make these arguments, but the theory developed in this Article further
contests the propriety of delegating such rights to mark holders, thereby
buttressing the claims of other scholars who have questioned producer
control over expressive meanings.194
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I summarized the theoretical underpinnings of an
empirical research agenda oriented towards the application of
psycholinguistics to trademark law. Future research will pointedly
examine how the theory works in practice and, hopefully, provide
further insight for the ongoing debates regarding the internal search
costs conception of dilution and genericness.
Trademark hybridity’s recognition of semantic ambiguity and its
application to trademark law provides some very serious reasons to
question the propriety of several longstanding, key features of
trademark law. Conceptual meaning is not binary—a trademarked term
is not merely a source identifier or not a source identifier. Rather, terms
can signify many concepts simultaneously with little internal confusion
when appropriate context is provided. In practice, context—whether
explicit or implicit—is always available. In addition to questioning
prevailing genericness and dilution doctrines, I also hope to spur a frank
conversation about what we seek to protect in trademark law—not what
we do protect, because that much is clear. Rather, if we really only care
about source identification and quality control, then the law must be
changed to reflect that. If we instead are happy with the extension of
trademark protection to incorporate other interests, we should at least be
clear about it and ensure that such a state of affairs is reflected explicitly
in the law rather than imported into the law through subterfuge under
other rationales.

193. See supra text accompanying notes 36–48.
194. See, e.g., Desai & Rierson, supra note 59, at 1838–42 (describing the negative effects of
such producer control).

